State institutions, which can be seen as the hardware for implementing formal agreements (including peace agreements, political covenants, power sharing agreements, etc.) and fostering more inclusive political settlements, are often not sufficiently or effectively engaged in core conflict issues (CCIs), including at subnational levels (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Cyprus, Nepal, South Africa, South Sudan, Tunisia, Yemen, Zimbabwe).
State institutions (electoral bodies, administrative and social services, and institutions designed through political settlements or peace agreements to address CCIs) regularly fail to deliver on their mandates (due to lack of political will, lack of capacity and resources, and corruption, all of which tend to reflect informal dynamics and power relations among actors at different levels) (all countries).
Societies express deep concern about the effectiveness of state institutions (especially service delivery and related poverty and inequality, as well as wider government accountability) through protest, illustrating a lack of faith in official governance mechanisms (for grievance recourse and meaningful inclusion)
(Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Nepal, South Africa, Tunisia, Yemen, Zimbabwe).
Customary, informal and other non-state structures and systems play important, though at times contested, institutional functions, particularly at subnational levels, yet, for the most part, they are neither officially nor systematically integrated into an inclusive political settlement, resulting in overlapping – and at times competing – social contracts (Colombia, Nepal, South Sudan, Yemen, Zimbabwe).
State legitimacy is influenced by many variables (historical, cultural, social, economic and political), and is supported or undermined by citizen expectations around service provision, corruption, avenues for participation and delivery on promises (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Cyprus, South Africa, Tunisia, Yemen, Zimbabwe).