



# **Forging Resilient National Social Contracts: Preventing Violent Conflict and Sustaining Peace**

## **Discussion Document on Early Summary Findings**

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*Please share comments with Project/Research Director,  
[erin.mccandless@gmail.com](mailto:erin.mccandless@gmail.com), by 15 January 2018*

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

ANC	African National Congress (South Africa)
CA	Constitutional Assembly (Nepal)
CCIs	Core Conflict Issues
CODESA	Convention for a Democratic South Africa
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Nepal)
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD)
DPA	Dayton Peace Accord
EU	European Union
FES	Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GNU	Government of National Unity (South Africa)
GNU	Government of National Unity (Zimbabwe)
GPA	Global Political Agreement (Zimbabwe)
GPC	General People’s Congress (Yemen)
IDEA	Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IFI	International Financial Institution
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change (Zimbabwe)
NDC	National Dialogue Conference (Yemen)
NGOs	Non-governmental organisations
NP	National Party (South Africa)
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OGC	Oslo Governance Centre
ONHRI	Organ for National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration (Zimbabwe)
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Plan (South Sudan)
SAIS	John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
SeeD	Center for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development
SPLA	Sudan People’s Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission (South Africa)
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNMIN	United Nations Mission in Nepal
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States of America
USIP	United States Institute for Peace
WB	World Bank
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front

## PROJECT AND DOCUMENT SUMMARY

“Forging Resilient National Social Contracts” is a twelve-country research and policy dialogue project that aims to revitalise the social contract concept in contexts affected by conflict and fragility, in order to advance policy and practice for preventing violent conflict and achieving and sustaining peace. The comparative findings aim to elucidate how the social contract manifests, adapts to, and is understood in different contexts. The project is supported by an esteemed group of scholars, policy advisers, and authors from the countries examined: *Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Colombia, Cyprus, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, South Africa, Tunisia, Yemen and Zimbabwe*. The project activities taking place from 2016-2018 include twelve country case studies and a series of policy and scholarly dialogues. They will culminate in a series policy papers on cross-cutting and critical themes emerging from the research, a scholarly book focused on the case studies, and policy-oriented publications on assessing and forging resilient national social contracts, to be launched in several settings internationally. The project gratefully receives support from *the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)/Oslo Governance Centre (OGC), the Julian J. Studley Fund of the Graduate Program of International Affairs at The New School, and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES)*, in Berlin and New York.

This Early Summary Findings Report introduces the project and its research framing, and shares early findings emerging from our case studies.<sup>1</sup> Nine of the twelve have so far been included. Several of these case studies are still in development and revision. These findings will be further developed and strengthened, on the basis of feedback and further working group dialogue. They will be complemented with policy recommendations targeting institutional actors at different levels. Findings were first shared, and feedback gratefully received from participants, at a workshop hosted by UNDP/OGC in Oslo, on 1 November 2017.

## INTRODUCTION

There is little doubt that in many countries, but especially those affected by conflict and fragility, the social contract is in deep crisis, and, that there is a need to better understand what this means for states and societies in different settings. Leaders and citizens across countries globally face extreme challenges and profound complexities in findings durable pathways for preventing violent conflict and achieving and sustaining peace. The international community is also greatly challenged to find winning formulas to support national actors in these endeavours, and to agree on broader, collective approaches to peace and security.

Within this context, the notion of the social contract is rising as a priority policy area to revitalise thinking and practice around how to transform and prevent violent conflict and forge lasting peace in countries affected by conflict and fragility. Leading policy actors engaging with the concept include [UNDP](#), the World Bank,<sup>2</sup> [the United States Institute for Peace \(USIP\)](#), and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The social contract also lies at the heart of much of the work of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and

<sup>1</sup> These summary findings were developed primarily by the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of the donors or working group advisers. Several advisers have however reviewed and contributed (see p. 40). All entries of country material (in the annex) are developed from country cases and have been reviewed by authors and/or developed with their support.

<sup>2</sup> See 2011 speech, “A New Social Contract for Development” by World Bank President Robert Zoellick (Zoellick, Robert. 2011. *The Middle East and North Africa: A new social contract for development*. Remarks delivered at the Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington, April 16.) The World Bank also has a new major study underway, on social contracts in Africa.

Statebuilding, and its “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States.” A driving member of this Dialogue, the g7+ intergovernmental organisation of countries affected by conflict, is also using the term to guide thinking on the transformation of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and national policy approaches in their countries.

The United Nations (UN) is presently revamping its mandate, with [2016 twin UN Security Council \(UNSC\)/UN General Assembly \(UNGA\) resolutions](#) that place preventing violent conflict and sustaining peace at the forefront of efforts. In emerging policy documents the notion of the social contract is centrally evident (though not explicit), in underpinning sustained peace. The twin resolutions suggest that sustaining peace is both a goal and a process to build a common vision of society, ensuring that all needs and segments of the population are taken into account. Sustaining peace, according to this new vision, encompasses a range of activities to prevent outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict flowing across the three, interlinked and mutually reinforcing pillars of development, peace and security, and human rights. This includes tackling the root causes of conflict. A 2017 World Bank-UN publication [“Pathways to Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict”](#) is similarly calling for a revitalised global commitment to preventing violent conflict, notably by addressing societal grievances and investing in, and building societal resilience and inclusive, risk-informed development.<sup>3</sup> Towards this end, inclusive, innovative and synergistic mechanisms that bring actors together, are needed.

These developments are promising. Policy action, however, needs to be fundamentally guided by a clearer understanding and recognition of what a social contract looks like, and means to different groups of people, in different countries affected by conflict and fragility. While the concept has deep roots across civilisations and is well established in political philosophy, its contemporary application to countries affected by conflict and fragility is not well understood.<sup>4</sup> Over the last decade the scholarship and policy research on statebuilding has investigated the role of elite-based political settlements in achieving stability, which has provided a critical foundation for this investigation.<sup>5</sup> The notion of the social contract, however, requires transcending elite bargains, and forging and linking more inclusive political settlements to durable arrangements for peace – notably, in institutions, and relationships. On the latter, research around how relationships are built and repaired in countries affected by conflict and fragility is growing, revitalising the topic of social cohesion.<sup>6</sup> This research is usefully digging into the social and economic dimensions of how states and societies, and groups within states, forge and sustain bonds. Consensus is still challenged however, on issues of conceptualisation and measurement, and how the concept and associated practices can effectively engage politics and transform root causes of conflict.

#### CASE STUDIES

Afghanistan  
Bosnia-Herzegovina  
Colombia  
Cyprus  
Nepal  
Sierra Leone  
Somalia  
South Africa  
South Sudan  
Tunisia  
Yemen  
Zimbabwe

<sup>3</sup> World Bank Group and United Nations, *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict*. 2017.

<sup>4</sup> Themes concern: i) its nature and purpose; ii) participants; iii) the mechanisms through which it is forged and fostered; iv) moral obligations and conflicting interests; and, v) wealth distribution.

<sup>5</sup> See, i.e. Menocal, Alina Rocha. 2015. *Inclusive Political Settlements*. University of Birmingham, June 2015.

<sup>6</sup> See, i.e. Sisk, Timothy. 2017. *Preventing Deadly Conflict in Ethnically Fractured Societies: International Development Assistance for “Bridging” Social Cohesion*. Background Paper for the United Nations/World Bank Flagship Study, Preventing Violent Conflict (2017).

Despite these promising research and policy trends, to date, there is precious little targeted, contemporary scholarship on the social contract that speaks to the varied, lived realities of people in different contexts, and notably, where people are profoundly struggling to redefine their relations with the state to achieve and sustain peace. These are key concerns driving the current inquiry of this twelve-country research and scholar-policy dialogue project, [“Forging Resilient Social Contracts: Preventing Violent Conflict and Sustaining Peace,”](#) supported by an international [Working Group of scholars and policy-advisers/makers](#). The comparative findings of this work aim to elucidate how the social contract manifests within, adapts to, and is understood in different contexts. This, it is hoped, will inspire and support synergistic policy directions that put national actors in the driver’s seat for developing common visions and trusted pathways for achieving and sustaining peace.

## SUMMARY PROJECT FRAMING

This research and policy dialogue project is focused on countries affected by conflict and fragility, inspired by the question: *What drives a resilient national social contract?* – in short – a dynamic national agreement between state and society, including different groups in society, on how to live together. Project researchers are investigating three postulated “drivers” of a resilient social contract, developed through in-depth examination of the relevant bodies of literature and extensive discussion within our Working Group of advisors. These are that: i) core conflict issues (CCIs) and fragility issues are progressively addressed through an increasingly inclusive political settlement; ii) the role of institutions in fostering inclusive results, and; iii) broadening and deepening social cohesion both horizontally (between individuals and groups in society) and vertically (between state and society). We are also reflecting on cross-cutting issues, on inclusion/exclusion, the role of international actors, and “resilience capacities for peace” in and across our twelve case studies. This focus of our research broadly encompasses core values and mechanisms associated with the social contract concept spanning time and geographical space, yet with attention to the dynamism and adaptability that countries in transition from conflict and fragility demand. The role of these drivers in forging *resilient national social contracts* is reflected on in Box 1.

### BOX 1: RESILIENT NATIONAL SOCIAL CONTRACTS

A resilient national social contract is a dynamic national agreement between state and society, including different groups in society, on how to live together, and notably, around how power is distributed and exercised. It allows for the peaceful mediation of different demands and conflicting interests, and different expectations and understandings of rights and responsibilities (including with nested and/or overlapping social contracts that may transcend the state), over time, and in response to contextual factors (including shocks and stressors), through varied mechanisms, institutions and processes.

This working definition builds upon policy discussions and an assessment of what is uniquely important about the social contract in countries affected by conflict and fragility. This assessment also stems from a deep review of evidence-based literature on peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts, as well as related, specific literature on state-making, political settlements, fragility, social cohesion, and political theory on the social contract.

## STUDY QUESTIONS, PROPOSITIONS AND RESEARCH

This research examines the following overarching questions:


- *What drives a resilient national social contract?*
- *How do social contracts evolve/adapt over time, in ways that facilitate and/or undermine achieving and sustaining peace? (top-down, bottom-up; path dependencies; sequencing; driver interactions)*
- *How do we know one when we see one?*
- *What are the implications for policy and scholarship, including in relation to the ways in which international actors can support nationally-owned processes of sustaining peace?*

The study’s research propositions are:

- A resilient national social contract lies at the heart of preventing violent conflict and achieving and sustaining peace.
- Strong movement on three “drivers” of a resilient national social contract holds particular importance.

Figure 1 shows the three postulated “drivers” of a resilient social contract:

**Figure 1: Three Drivers of Resilient Social Contracts**




**BOX 2: POSTULATED THREE “DRIVERS” OF RESILIENT SOCIAL CONTRACTS**

1. **Core conflict issues (CCIs) are being progressively addressed** through an evolving, inclusive, political settlement and requisite spheres and mechanisms of “social contract-making.”
2. **Increasingly effective, fair, and inclusive institutions** (both formal and informal and encompassing state, customary, other non-state and international) **are performing key functions with results and benefits shared more broadly, and state legitimacy evolving.**
3. **There is broadening and deepening social cohesion**, understood as the formal and informal ties that hold society together both horizontally (across citizens, between groups) and vertically (in the relations between citizens/groups and the state).

**Addressing core conflict issues**

The first driver engages the burgeoning literature on the need for inclusive political settlements to achieve and sustain peace: firstly, on the need for the root causes of conflict to be addressed; and, secondly, on the need for peace agreements to be well designed and implemented, with attention on addressing root causes of conflict, as well as historic grievances of groups.<sup>7</sup> Specifically, the approach to this driver is premised on the need for stronger mapping of the linkages and transitional pathways – both conceptual and practical – between peace agreements, underlying political settlements, and the forging of resilient social contracts. Towards this end, this research develops a typology around “institutional spheres of social contract-making” (see Figure 2). In this part of the investigation, a limited number of CCI are looked at – and whether and how these are being progressively addressed, in ways that are increasingly, widely owned. CCI are chosen as issues broadly agreed on by the main parties and society at large, to drive conflict and discord. These are disputed in the policy arena over time, and ideally, are reflected in agreements. This approach investigates how issues evolve and change thereby shaping results, as well as how ownership is reflected and built around efforts to resolve and transform them. It also offers rich insight into what has gone well, and not well, in particular settings, and why.

**Figure 2: Institutional Spheres of Social Contract Making**



This study considers how commitments in the “peacemaking” sphere at the national, political level (e.g. through a peace agreement) are linked to, and addressed in other spheres (transitional, governance, the everyday) and through related mechanisms. Examining how CCI are addressed through these “social contract-making” spheres and mechanisms guides insight into how a resilient social contract is forged, with greater inclusion of society in both the process and

results. These spheres and related mechanisms can be defined as: “transitional” (i.e. sequenced dialogues, commissions, truth and reconciliation processes); “governance,” including both “official” (i.e. codified structures of government, formal institutions, national development plans, devolution frameworks/policies) and “hybrid” (i.e. where religious/ customary/ non-state actor and state mechanisms interact); and in the “everyday” sphere (i.e. citizen actions, practices, norms, mores). The everyday sphere also acts, in this study, as a litmus test to ascertain whether higher level, formalised agreements or processes effectively represent wider societal views.

<sup>7</sup> Evidence suggests peace agreement failure and war reversion are due to the sheer complexity of factors, as well as poor settlement design and implementation. See, i.e. Mack, Andrew. 2007. “Global Political Violence: Explaining the Post-Cold War Decline.” *Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series*. New York: International Peace Academy, March 3, 2007, and; United Nations, Report of the Advisory Group of Experts, “The Challenge of Sustaining Peace,” June 29, 2015, 46. The new World Bank-UN study on conflict prevention has revived interest in the role of grievances in conflict and the need to address them to prevent its escalation. World Bank Group and United Nations, 2017. *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict*.



***Increasingly effective, fair and inclusive institutions***

The second driver responds to the rising awareness in the statebuilding literature of the need to better understand the relationships between access to services, and perceptions of the legitimacy and performance of government. The assumed direct causal relationship can no longer be taken for granted.<sup>8</sup> The research on this set of issues seeks to provide context-rich and comparative analysis of the different ways in which key services are being delivered and what actually matters to people in different contexts. Here, the following issues are explored:

- performance (the effectiveness and fairness of delivery, and outcomes, especially for different groups);
- expectations (of society about the roles and functions of the state and its institutions, and how these expectations change, and in relation to what factors); and,
- processes (the avenues for quality participation) and for grievance recourse (the existence of, desire for, and effectiveness of these avenues).

We are also considering how these issues affect societal understandings of the legitimacy of the state and its institutions in case context, inspired by the OECD typology of legitimacy that suggests that there are the four following types: input/process; output/performance; shared beliefs; and, international legitimacy.<sup>9</sup>

***Broadening and deepening social cohesion***

The third driver responds to the consensus evolving in the policy community around the need to better understand social cohesion, that is, how people and groups bond in constructive ways that support peace. This is imperative in the context of peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts, as lack of social cohesion is linked to conflict.<sup>10</sup> There is a need to know more about how relationships across society (horizontally) and between the state and society (vertically) are forged, and the dynamism and interplay within and between them, in particular contexts and in response to events and policies. This clearly lies at the heart of the very notion of a social contract, and, equally, at the core of the question of whether the international systems of states will continue to survive, and in what form. Research has grown over the last couple of years in this area, yet is still at an early stage. Consensus is generally lacking on how to conceptualise social cohesion, let alone how to measure it.

Figure 3 below illustrates the study's approach to social cohesion which examines the ways that people bond vertically and horizontally through three domains grounded in the literature: *belonging and identification*; *trust and respect*; and, *access, participation and representation*. This research aims to contribute to thinking about how social cohesion advances and/or is undermined as CCIs are addressed (Driver 1) and core functions are undertaken, and services delivered (Driver 2). This will contribute to a more dynamic, adaptive conceptualisation of social cohesion that is critically needed to inform better policy and practice. The three drivers capture both substantive, material aspects of the social contract, i.e. what needs to be delivered, and the rights, responsibilities and expectations around these, as well as the process elements, i.e. the nature of participation, exclusion and inclusion, and forms of accountability. Supporting thinking about what constitutes a resilient social contract, they endeavour to investigate process, evolution, dynamism and adaptation in virtuous ways, i.e. that transform root causes of conflict and prevent it from recurring, and moving countries towards achieving and sustaining peace.

<sup>8</sup> See Mallett, Richard; Jessica Hagen-Zanker; Rachel Slater and Georgina Sturge. "Surveying livelihoods, Service Delivery and Governance: Baseline Evidence from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Uganda: Working Paper 31," ODI, 2015.

<sup>9</sup> OECD. 2015. *States of Fragility 2015: Meeting Post-2015 Ambitions*. OECD Publishing: Paris.

<sup>10</sup> Sisk (2017) points to examples, including Turkey, Indonesia, Kashmir, Kosovo, and Ukraine.

## CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

Issues of **inclusion and exclusion** are investigated across the three drivers. In many cases variants on the theme of exclusion are in fact CCIs. Inclusivity through each of the social contract-making spheres is examined, with respect to how CCIs are addressed. Attention is also given to how this affects the adaptations in the process, as well as the results. In looking at delivery of services, authors have been asked to examine the ways in which “who delivers” matters, when and how participation matters and results (subjective and objective). In our social cohesion research, inclusion is examined in different ways through the domains of investigation, including examination of both perceptions and practices linked to what holds people, communities and societies together.

Intersecting with these three areas are questions around the roles of **international actors and issues** in forging resilient national social contracts. These cannot be overlooked given the major roles they play in today’s transitional settings, especially in relation to political processes and political settlements, in addition to ongoing processes of peacebuilding, statebuilding and development. Greater reflection is needed on the roles that international actors can play in “accompanying” local actors as they strive to forge an understanding about how to ultimately live together, and how this affects understanding about the nature and durability of a social contract. The question of how international actors address and support societal efforts (directly) versus government efforts (directly), and processes that link them is key – the politics around how this is done and the implications for fostering a nationally-owned social contract that serves sustainable peace, remains profoundly challenging, and important.

Finally, in addition to investigating select CCIs, what are referred to as **resilience capacities for peace** are also examined.<sup>11</sup> This research approach is consistent with endeavours to understand how national actors can better engage their endogenous capacities to address conflict, as well as to understand wider shocks and stressors, in ways that ultimately serve to uproot and transform the drivers of conflict and fragility, and foster new or revitalised structures and systems that support peace. The authors here collectively reflect on how selected resilience capacities are directly or indirectly engaged in the design and implementation of peace efforts. They ask how resilience capacities can better support, in virtuous ways, the achieving and sustaining of peace. These questions and propositions are being examined through both exploratory and explanatory research methods, through interviews, focus groups, and qualitative methods, led by national authors. Across the three drivers, authors have been asked to consider the different concerns and interests of social groups, notably women, youth, and ethnic and religious groups. While the emphasis of case study research is qualitative and context-rich, survey data is being used to buttress research findings throughout. Findings will be validated in numerous ways, notably through a series of scholar-policy “dialogues” and, eventually, through the development of an “expert-based” scoring scheme around the three “drivers.”<sup>12</sup> This will enrich the potential for comparative policy findings, serving as a pilot for development of a possible social contract index.

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<sup>11</sup> This approach draws upon on an Interpeace paper that lays a foundation for conceptualising a “resilience for peacebuilding” approach, distinguishing the concept which “has evolved from a more narrowly defined notion of a set of attributes, qualities or capacities that enable a society or community to endure, respond or ‘bounce back from external shocks,’ to a more process-oriented and relational concept, that speaks particularly to the agency of individuals, groups, communities, institutions and societies in shaping their environment, including dealing with stressors and conflict within the context of complex adaptive social systems.” McCandless, Erin and Graeme Simpson. 2015. *Assessing Resilience for Peacebuilding – Executive Summary*. Interpeace, June 2015. <http://www.interpeace.org/resource/assessing-resilience-for-peacebuilding-executive-summary-of-discussion/>

<sup>12</sup> The analysis’ quantitative scoring dimension will draw upon the author’s qualitative research as well as available quantitative data.

**BOX 3: KEY DEFINITIONS**

**Resilient national social contract:** A dynamic national agreement between state and society, including different groups in society, on how to live together, and notably, around how power is distributed and exercised. It allows for the peaceful mediation of different demands and conflicting interests, and different expectations and understandings of rights and responsibilities (including with nested and/or overlapping social contracts that may transcend the state), over time, and in response to contextual factors (including shocks and stressors), through varied mechanisms, institutions and processes.

**Resilience capacities for peace:** Endogenous capacities to address shocks and stressors (e.g. drivers of conflict and fragility) in ways that minimally (adaptively) mitigate the effects of conflict and more maximally (transformatively) uproot drivers and foster new or revitalised structures and systems that support peace.<sup>13</sup>

**Core conflict issues (CCIs):** Overt drivers of conflict and discord, either historical, or contemporary in nature, broadly agreed by the main parties to drive conflict and discord, that are being disputed in the policy arena nationally, over time, and have resonance for most, if not all of the population. They are ideally reflected in formal agreements or mechanisms.<sup>14</sup> Examining CCIs should enable analysis of how the state and society at different levels engage the issues and how they adapt, over time.

**Political settlements:** The concept of a “political settlement” is contested, though generally it is accepted that it constitutes:

- **A consensus between political elites on the underlying rules of the game:** A key aspect of a political settlement is: “the forging of a common understanding usually between political elites that their best interests or beliefs are served through acquiescence to a framework for administering political power”;<sup>15</sup>
- **An ongoing process containing specific events such as elite bargains and peace agreements:** i.e. “Political settlements are ongoing political processes that include one-off events and agreements. Elite pacts, elite bargains and peace agreements are discrete political events, rather than dynamic processes.”<sup>16</sup>

**“Everyday” social contract-making:** Forms of “everyday” (or quotidian) social contract-making are being conceptualised as they constitute daily-life social interactions, norms and agreements in social, political and economic life.<sup>17</sup>

**Social cohesion:** The formal and informal ties that hold society together both horizontally (across citizens, between groups) and vertically (in the relations between citizens/groups and the state).

<sup>13</sup> Conceptualisation draws upon: McCandless, Erin and Graeme Simpson. 2015. *Assessing Resilience for Peacebuilding – Executive Summary*. Interpeace, June 2015.

<sup>14</sup> While policy attention to addressing root causes is gaining strength, and the notion of grievances is experiencing a revival thanks to a new World Bank – UN report (2017), an approach focused on CCIs allows for engagement of both, but with a focus on a tangible, more neutral expression of the issue that can be examined over time, in the context of agreements and policies.

<sup>15</sup> Di John, Jonathan and James Putzel. 2009. *Political Settlements Issues Paper*. GSRDC.

<sup>16</sup> Schunemann, Julia and Amanda Lucey. 2015. *Success and Failure of Political Settlements: Defining and Measuring Transformation*. Political Settlements Research Programme. 2 September 2015, p9.

<sup>17</sup> While there is often a conflation between this concept and “local” peacebuilding, in this study it refers to both: a) the everyday at any level, including at the elite level, e.g. what elites actually do outside the formal agreements; and, b) the everyday at local levels, assisting in examining these issues in a deeper way, core to the notion of the social contract, effectively linking the “bottom” with the “top.”

## SUMMARY PROJECT FINDINGS

The following early, draft findings are emerging from case studies (nine of the twelve have been included at the time of publication). Several cases are still in development and revision, so we anticipate that these findings will be further developed and strengthened. See the Annex for a fuller description of these early findings.

***Driver 1: Core conflict issues (CCIs) are being progressively addressed through an evolving, inclusive, political settlement and different spheres of “social contract-making.”***

- **D1.1 The early stages of the peace negotiations (and notably the peace agreement) offer possibilities for redefining parameters for inclusion and exclusion, and positioning of different groups and issues, often with long-term effects and repercussions (negative or positive)** (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Cyprus, Nepal, South Africa, South Sudan, Tunisia, Yemen, Zimbabwe).
- **D1.2 Social contract-making “spheres” and “mechanisms,” which are useful for tracing how core conflict issues and grievances are being addressed, are often not well linked up in ways that promote coherent and effective peace agreement implementation and the development of an increasingly inclusive political settlement** (Colombia, Cyprus, Nepal, South Africa, South Sudan, Yemen, Zimbabwe; exception: Tunisia).
- **D1.3 There are considerable commonalities of CCIs across the cases, reflecting issues around political and economic exclusion, particularly between identity groups. Notably common are:**
  - ~ ***power distribution and power sharing*** (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Cyprus, Nepal, South Sudan, Yemen, Zimbabwe); and,
  - ~ ***distribution of land and resources*** (Colombia, Cyprus, Nepal, South Sudan, Yemen, Zimbabwe).
- **D1.4 CCIs are often not effectively addressed over time, including through previous peace processes and agreements, directly undermining the inclusiveness of the political settlement:**
  - ~ ***in the agreement design*** (Yemen);
  - ~ ***due to extant contradictions that undermine agreements*** (Colombia, South Africa); and,
  - ~ ***through agreement implementation*** (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Nepal, South Africa, South Sudan, Tunisia, Zimbabwe).

***Driver 2: Increasingly effective, fair, and inclusive institutions (both formal and informal and encompassing state, customary, other non-state, international) are performing key functions with broadly shared results.***

- **D2.1 State institutions, which can be seen as the hardware for carrying forward peace agreement implementation and in fostering more inclusive political settlements, are often not sufficiently or effectively engaged in addressing CCIs, including at sub-national levels** (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Cyprus, Nepal, South Africa, South Sudan, Tunisia, Yemen).

- **D2.2 State institutions (electoral bodies, administrative and social services, and institutions designed through peace agreements to address CCIs) are often not effectively delivering on their respective mandates (due to lack of political will, lack of capacity and resources, and corruption, all of which tend to reflect informal dynamics and power relations among actors at different levels) (All countries).**
- **D2.3 Societies are reflecting deep concern about the effectiveness of state institutions (especially service delivery and related poverty and inequality, as well as wider government accountability) through protest, illustrating a lack of faith in official governance mechanisms (for grievance recourse and meaningful inclusion) (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Nepal, South Africa, Tunisia, Yemen, Zimbabwe).**
- **D2.4 Customary, informal and other non-state structures and systems are commonly playing important, though at times contested, institutional functions, particularly at sub-national levels, yet are often not officially or systematically integrated into an inclusive political settlement (Colombia, South Sudan, Yemen, Zimbabwe).**
- **D2.5 State legitimacy (and how societal expectations factor into this), which is multi-dimensional given the many variables (historical, cultural, social, economic and political) at play, often relates to citizen perspectives around service provision, corruption, avenues for participation and delivery on promises (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, South Africa, Tunisia, Yemen, Zimbabwe).**

***Driver 3: There is broadening and deepening social cohesion – understood as the formal and informal ties that hold society together both horizontally (across and between citizens and between groups) and vertically (in the relations between citizens/groups, and the state).***

- **D3.1 Vertical social cohesion (relations between the state, and some groups and citizens) is not strong in the case studies, which helps explain the weakness of national social contracts (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Nepal, South Africa, South Sudan, Tunisia, Yemen, Zimbabwe).**
- **D3.2 Horizontal social cohesion tends to be stronger within groups than between them, and weaker when political issues (rather than ethnic or religious issues) are dominant (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Cyprus, Nepal, South Africa, Tunisia, Yemen, Zimbabwe).**

## **CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES**

### **EXCLUSION AND INCLUSION**

- **4.1 Inclusive processes do not automatically or quickly tend to lead to inclusive results, given the potential for other intervening factors (political will, misuse of power, capacity and resources, poor design and/or process, poor or lacking implementation frameworks) (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Nepal, South Africa, Yemen, Zimbabwe).**

## INTERNATIONAL ACTORS AND ISSUES

- **5.1 While the international community plays vital supporting roles to countries in transition, at times positions taken to support peace agreements and the social contract-making mechanisms that follow, can inadvertently undermine the ability to transformatively address CCIs (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Cyprus, Nepal, South Africa, Tunisia, Yemen, Zimbabwe).**

## RESILIENT SOCIAL CONTRACTS AND SUSTAINING PEACE

- **6.1 What is needed to achieve a more resilient national social contract, and move countries on a path to sustaining peace?**

*~ Virtuous movement of each of these three drivers, and virtuous interaction of the drivers (Cyprus, Tunisia, Yemen, Zimbabwe).*

*~ CCIs attended to, in and through social contract-making spheres and mechanisms, in inclusive ways (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Nepal, South Sudan, Yemen, Zimbabwe).*

*~ Resilience capacities in society, mobilised and supported, towards peace (Cyprus, Nepal, South Africa, Yemen, Zimbabwe).*

## ANNEX – SUMMARY PROJECT FINDINGS WITH CASE EXAMPLES

The following draft findings are emerging from this study’s case studies (nine of the twelve have so far been included). Several of these cases are still in development and revision, so we anticipate that these findings will be further developed and strengthened. In sharing comparative summary findings there are limitations to how well all factors can be accounted for, and causality proved and explained. Causality is also challenged across social scientific research generally, by the very reality of multi-causal social phenomenon. The best that social science research can do is work for validity and trustworthiness, by triangulating forms of data and rigorous analysis. This is expected from all of the authors of this study. The twelve case studies are also being rigorously peer reviewed, by both external and internal (within this study’s working group) experts.

The findings are presented through the project framing, in relation to the three proposed “drivers” of a resilient social contract as discussed in the Summary Findings, as well as through a number of cross-cutting issues (inclusion and exclusion, international actors and issues, and resilient social contracts and sustaining peace).

***Driver 1: Core conflict issues (CCIs) are being progressively addressed through an evolving, inclusive, political settlement and different spheres of “social contract-making.”***

*There exists burgeoning literature on the importance of inclusive political settlements in the interests of sustaining peace, to which this research aims to contribute. This study’s authors are seeking to map the pathways from the political settlements to resilient national social contracts. The first “driver” looks at inclusion through the lens of a limited number of CCIs, including whether and how these are being progressively addressed, through approaches increasingly, widely owned. The following is considered: how commitments made in the “peacemaking” sphere at the national, political level (i.e. through a peace agreement) are linked to and addressed in other spheres and through related mechanisms of social contract-making in support of comprehensive, societally-owned addressing of the issues (see Figure 2). These spheres and related mechanisms include: “transitional” (i.e. sequenced dialogues, commissions, truth and reconciliation processes); “formal governance” (i.e. codified structures of government, formal institutions, national development plans, devolution frameworks/policies); “hybrid” (i.e. where civil society/religious/customary and state mechanisms interact); and, the “everyday” sphere (i.e. citizen actions, practices, norms, mores). Early findings include:*

- **D1.1 The early stages of the peace negotiations (and notably the peace agreement) offer possibilities for redefining parameters for inclusion and exclusion, and positioning of different groups and issues, often with long-term effects and repercussions (positive or negative)** (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Cyprus, Nepal, South Africa, South Sudan, Tunisia, Yemen, Zimbabwe).

Early findings from the case studies illustrate that this occurs through:

- The catalysing of more inclusive politics (Colombia, Nepal, South Africa, Tunisia);
- The development of separate ethno-nationalist institutions (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, South Sudan);
- Citizens/groups feeling excluded and becoming spoilers (Yemen, Zimbabwe); and,
- The propensity for informal agreements that undermine the official agreement/process (Yemen, Zimbabwe).

Power-sharing (South Africa, Nepal, Zimbabwe) and transition monitoring mechanisms (Colombia), that have brought new parties into the equation, and peace negotiations (Yemen, Nepal) that have guaranteed participation of diverse actors, by opening up participation, have enabled the surpassing of historic impasses around core conflict issues in more inclusive ways. Advances however, are often difficult to sustain (Yemen, Nepal, South Africa). In South Sudan and Zimbabwe where power-sharing arrangements were developed, these reflected entrenched elite political settlements and ultimately failed.

**CYPRUS and BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA:** In both settings, ethno-national, sub-national social contracts have evolved and become entrenched through the peace process, creating strong structures of inclusion and exclusion (i.e. of minorities). In **CYPRUS**, unsuccessful efforts to forge a political agreement that would reflect a more unified and inclusive political settlement to address core conflict issues, have been hampered through an excessive focus on formal track 1 peace negotiations within a framework of “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.” In **BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**, the Dayton Peace Accord (DPA) has profoundly structured politics and the resulting institutions along ethno-nationalist lines. The process involved only elites and excluded all minorities and civil society, with lasting policy implications.

**SOUTH SUDAN:** The Arab-Islamic hegemonic policies pursued by the northern elites in post-independent Sudan provided the glue that united the people of South Sudan to fight for independence. The various peace agreements signed between the central government and rebel groups in South Sudan since independence in 2011 have handed power to the ex-combatants and elites of the two main ethnic groups (Dinka and Nuer), through power-sharing agreements that have side-lined smaller ethnic groups. These processes have failed to forge a nationally owned social contract resulting in the eruption of civil war in 2013.

**YEMEN:** The transition process outlined by the 2011 UN backed Gulf Cooperation Council initiative (GCC) created the power-sharing agreement that included factions from the Joint Meeting Parties and the former ruling party of the General People’s Congress (GPC). The subsequent National Dialogue Conference (NDC) aimed to bring parties under one unified umbrella to draft a constitution rooted in the values of freedom, human rights and democracy, and ultimately stem the conflict. The vibrant NDC process – often referred to as highly inclusive (see 4.1) – originally restored hope in the transitional process to bring positive change among activists. While its objectives were partially achieved, the process faltered when a “federalism” proposal was introduced by President Hadi’s committee without sufficient debate or consensus among the NDC working groups, and fears that it ceded more fiscal powers to Sana’a, the capital. This proposal was counterproductive to the idea of equal representation under federalism. The NDC also lacked a clear mechanism to deal with spoilers, and backdoor deals became common amongst many participants, undermining the legitimacy of the process.

**ZIMBABWE:** The 2009 Global Political Agreement (GPA) fostered a Government of National Unity (GNU) power-sharing agreement between the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF, in power for 28 years at the time) and the two Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) parties. The GPA offered hope for a more inclusive path to addressing Zimbabwe’s historic grievances (see D1.3). At the same time, it was ultimately “an agreement to disagree,” reflecting ZANU-PF positions on land, the liberation struggle and sovereignty, and MDC positions on constitutional reforms, human rights, rule of law, the impartiality of chiefs and state organs, and free political activity. This ultimately meant that reforms existed on paper, resulting in weak transitional mechanisms, and resistance to GPA implementation. The 2017 coup and mass protests leading up to the overthrow of the ZANU-PF’s leader of 37 years, Robert Mugabe, illustrate the strong demand for a more inclusive political settlement. However, there are concerns that the lack of movement towards a power sharing government indicate business as usual.



**TUNISIA:** Elite compromise and power-sharing has proven to be an important component of Tunisia's transition. Following the 2011 revolution, Tunisia's elite class, with the blessing of the then-interim Prime Minister, created the Higher Political Reform Commission, which became the de-facto legislative branch until it was disbanded after the 2011 elections. Despite free and fair elections and progress toward the new constitution, the country experienced severe stress in late 2013, as tensions between Islamist and secular political parties and segments of society came to a head, in the wake of the assassinations of two prominent secular political leaders and activists. These tensions would have escalated out of control had it not been for the intervention of four mass membership civil society organizations known as The Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet. These two political settlement processes, exemplary in their inclusiveness, culminated in Tunisia's widely adopted 2014 Constitution.

**COLOMBIA:** The 2016 peace agreement includes provisions to address root causes of exclusion and violence at the heart of the conflict. These include long standing issues in relation to land use and ownership and effective political participation of minority groups in the political process. Transitional justice mechanisms were also designed to compensate the more than eight million victims with reparations that seek to address fundamental social inequalities. The fact that an agreement has finally been reached suggests that a window of opportunity has emerged for a more inclusive social contract and that there is some institutionally embedded social support for profound transformation. At the same time, in 2016, the peace agreement only had the support of 41% of the population. This suggests that there still remains a schism between the ambitions of those who drafted the agreement and the political and social preferences of large portions of society, who are fearful that too much inclusion will affect their privileges and undermine their world views.

**NEPAL:** Nepal's democratisation and peacebuilding process from 2006-2015 was designed to create a "New Nepal" based on inclusivity, fairness, and remediation of historical injustices and inequalities. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) provides an ambitious roadmap for the peace process including the "restructuring of the State in an inclusive, democratic and progressive way by ending its present centralised and unitary structure, designed to address the concerns of the marginalised groups."<sup>18</sup> While this is seen as a commitment to increasingly promoting the norm of inclusion in Nepal's political institutions in order to address historical exclusions and inequalities, there continues to be entrenched grievances, ethnic mobilisation, and divisive political mobilisation that undermines the resilience of the newly emerging social contract.

**SOUTH AFRICA:** Negotiations that began with the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990 and ended along with apartheid were deemed successful in laying a path for a new, democratic South Africa. Despite the more radical commitments that would have addressed grievances and resulted in a transformation of the economy envisaged by anti-apartheid South Africans and enshrined in the Freedom Charter, concessions were made including to protect the individual property rights of the wealthy, that were embedded in transitional agreements and later policies.<sup>19</sup> These undermined the ability of the state to transform the highly unequal relations and deal with gross violations of collective human rights, and resulted in a further politicisation of identity. The transition process also failed to create safeguards to prevent what is now commonly referred to as elite capture, by the African National Congress (ANC) government. This has also contributed to a deficit in inclusion ideals translating into a more inclusive political settlement.

<sup>18</sup> Comprehensive Peace Agreement, para 3.5.

<sup>19</sup> The pursuit of the latter was from the onset framed as necessary but limited by state resources, which were in turn limited by subsequent economic policies that protect the individual property rights of the wealthy. Framing transitional justice in relation to individual victims of gross human rights violations further failed to account for the broader injustices experienced by different identity groups and communities, which now need to have their grievances addressed through development plans – which are dependent on state resources.

- **D1.2 Social contract-making “spheres” and “mechanisms,” which are useful for tracing how core conflict issues and grievances are being addressed, are often not well linked up in ways that promote coherent and effective peace agreement implementation and the development of an increasingly inclusive political settlement** (Colombia, Cyprus, Nepal, South Africa, South Sudan, Yemen, Zimbabwe; exception: Tunisia).

Early findings from the case studies illustrate that this occurs through:

- Missing or ineffective transitional mechanisms (Cyprus, Zimbabwe);
- Peace agreements that contain or evolve conflicting provisions (Colombia, South Africa), preventing them from fundamentally altering power relations; and,
- Successive social contract-making mechanisms not maintaining agreed approaches to address issues (i.e. constitutional reform processes, Nepal), or not effectively incorporated towards ensuring a more inclusive political settlement (i.e. customary systems, Yemen, Zimbabwe).

In some settings, inclusive constitutional reform and referendum processes positively contributed to building greater inclusion in political settlements, and in building societal ownership around policy directions (Tunisia, Zimbabwe). Implementation of these has however broken down for reasons including lack of political will, resources and capacity (Nepal, Zimbabwe).

In **CYPRUS**, while great emphasis is being placed on the peacemaking sphere of social contract-making, minimal effort is being invested in needed transitional mechanisms. Four decades following the cessation of hostilities, neither truth and reconciliation process nor formal political apologies to address mutual suffering have been initiated. The same is true in **ZIMBABWE** where successive political agreements have made no meaningful attempt at national reconciliation by addressing past violence and abuses. While the 2009 GPA held promise, rooted in a power sharing arrangement, the transitional mechanism designed to support healing, the Organ for National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration’s (ONHRI), was handicapped from inception. Paradoxically ONHRI is headed by ZANU-PF, perpetrator of the 1987 Gukurahundi massacre as it sought to build a one-party state. Societal calls for both retributive and restorative justice have largely been ignored.

More generally, in **ZIMBABWE**, the 2013 Constitution also held promise for its broadly shared buy-in, despite its elite (political party) driven development that took three years due to disagreements that sometimes turned violent. It promised to address historic demands by civil society and the opposition through power-sharing clauses, including presidential term limits, an independent judiciary and prosecuting authority, and, it clarified the roles of traditional authorities. Despite being approved with a 98% “yes” vote in 2013, confirming societal faith in the path articulated, implementation has been greatly hindered by the end of the power-sharing agreement and a ZANU-PF 2013 election win.

**SOUTH AFRICA:** The transitional negotiations (1990-1996) between the African National Congress (ANC) and the National Party (NP) included formal negotiations of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) I & II, the Interim Constitution, the Government of National Unity (GNU), the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), and the adoption of South Africa’s existing Constitution in 1996. The radical transformation needed and desired, as set out in the ANC’s guiding document, The Freedom Charter, was however undermined by the State’s will and capacity to meet commitments (as indicated by post-transition revelations of poor governance practice and ongoing corruption scandals). Parallel concessions to white-owned businesses at the time also contributed to the continued concentration of wealth in the hands of the white minority, although this minority has racially diversified post-1994.

**COLOMBIA:** The 2016 peace agreement accurately sets out to address the main challenges for sustainable peace in the country, such as rural reform (including improving possibilities for land ownership, productivity, and competitiveness for poor farmers and small-scale peasants), illicit crops, political participation of minority groups, and transitional justice. Some transitional mechanisms, such as the Constitutional Court-mandated system, respond to the needs of the forcibly displaced population or the executive agency in charge of reintegrating former combatants. These have gained international acknowledgment. Yet competing visions about how to manage land use and ownership and illicit crops are an obstacle to a smooth unfolding of transitional justice mechanisms and the extent to which they can redress structural conditions related to victimisation. There is also little coordination among and within state institutions promoting implementation of the peace accords, especially at the sub-national level.

**NEPAL:** Despite the commitment to a “New Nepal” (see D1.1), transition has been episodic, “non-linear,” and fraught with instability (through the CPA, the interim period, the first and second constitution-making processes, and most recently through the reconstitution of local authorities). The second Constitutional Assembly (CA-II) election took place in 2013 and the representation of the historically marginalised groups in the CA-I was reduced. Further, the vision of “A New Nepal” disappeared from political discourse. The 2015 Constitution reversed many of the achievements guaranteed by the 2007 Interim Constitution, according to excluded groups. For example, it resulted in an electoral system that left the groups from the Tarai under-represented in the national legislature, while the federal boundaries were carved out in a manner to suit the ruling elite. This led to violent protests and deaths in 2015 (see D2.3).

**YEMEN:** The 2011 GCC agreement was introduced to end the deadlock in Yemen’s political transition after the Arab Spring and begin a transition period whereby the National Coalition Government (General People’s Congress and its allies) and the National Council (Joint Meeting Parties and partners) would share power in governing the country under Abdo Rabu Mansour Hadi’s presidency for two years (February 2012-2014). However, the NDC process lacked societal buy-in as it side-lined sub-national players and failed to incorporate sub-national mechanisms capable of addressing issues at local levels. Ultimately it was seen as a power shuffle among competing parties, turning the NDC into an intellectual, capital-driven exercise. Yemenis registered great dissatisfaction with the process through protests, strikes, and sit-ins that demanded the removal of (now late) ex-President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s family members and affiliates from influential positions within the security apparatus, government and public institutions. Public discontent over the role of state institutions demonstrated a fundamental disconnect between the spheres of social contract-making and the aspirations of people. Although the political settlement was a compromise geared towards preventing conflict, Yemeni citizens resisted submitting to a process that simply reshuffled power and did not change the system.

**TUNISIA:** Several key post-revolution initiatives (formal and informal) can be viewed as a series of social contract-making mechanisms struggling to forge a nationally-owned social contract. These include a high-level national dialogue, a forward-looking constitution adopted by broad consensus, and multiple participatory commissions launched to examine and resolve challenging issues, including fighting corruption and coming to terms with the painful legacies of past human rights violations. Of particular importance is the 2014 Constitution, hailed as a model for what consensus-based politics, dialogue, and compromise, can achieve between Islamists and secularists. Key drivers of its success were: inclusivity, participation, transparency, consensus, national ownership, and the Assembly’s early decision to require a two-thirds majority for adopting the final text of the constitution, rather than a simple majority. The devolution of power to sub-national levels however, which is a constitutional provision, is sluggish, resulting in ongoing exclusion and neglect, notably in northern and interior regions.

- **D1.3 There are considerable commonalities of CCI across the cases, reflecting issues around political and economic exclusion, particularly between identity groups. Notably common are:**
  - ~ *power distribution and power-sharing* (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Cyprus, Nepal, South Sudan, Yemen, Zimbabwe); and,
  - ~ *distribution of land and resources* (Colombia, Cyprus, Nepal, South Sudan, Yemen, Zimbabwe).

These are conceptualised slightly differently, in the case studies, as highlighted below (D1.4). The use of CCI provides a lens to see how the issue is understood in a more inclusive manner, addressing grievances and perspectives of different parties and stakeholders over time, and through institutions and sectors.

- **D1.4 CCI are often not effectively addressed, and have often not been effectively addressed over time, including through previous peace processes and agreements, directly undermining the inclusiveness of the political settlement:**
  - ~ *in the agreement design* (Yemen, Zimbabwe);
  - ~ *due to extant contradictions that undermine agreements* (Colombia, South Africa); and,
  - ~ *through poor agreement implementation* (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Nepal, South Africa, South Sudan, Tunisia, Zimbabwe).

In many cases these CCI have existed through a significant part of the country's history and not effectively addressed through consecutive political agreements and social contracts (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Nepal, South Africa, South Sudan, Zimbabwe).

**YEMEN:** The main question surrounding CCI (unequal distribution of power and service delivery) is not whether they have been addressed, but rather *how*. The transition environment outside of the NDC was not attended to, which affected the transitional government's legitimacy. During the transition, service delivery continued to be unequal, favouring the capital. Power distribution was described as "a game of musical chairs,"<sup>20</sup> as many actors who were engaged in activities that had institutionalised the state's malfunction, were now members of the new system. While federalism was introduced to enable regional communities to manage their resources better, as noted in D1.1, this proposal was not supported and resulted in undermining the outcomes of the dialogue.

**COLOMBIA:** The 2016 Colombian peace agreement accurately sets out to address the main, historic impediments for sustainable peace in the country, including the CCI (land issues and illicit crops). Whether Colombia progresses towards a more inclusive social contract will require confronting the deeply entrenched interests and structural conditions that operate beyond the control of the state and ensuring institutions facilitate needed transformations.

**SOUTH AFRICA:** CCI (service delivery and economic participation) were depoliticised, along with other contentious issues classified as "reconstruction and development" concerns.<sup>21</sup> However, like approaches to other contentious political and structural issues (land distribution, the accumulation of white capital during apartheid), this approach ignored the foundations and intractability of white privilege and wealth (operating in

<sup>20</sup> International Crisis Group. 2012. "Yemen: Enduring Conflicts, Threatened Transition." *Report 125*, 3 July 2012.

<https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/yemen-enduring-conflicts-threatened-transition>

<sup>21</sup> African National Congress. 1994. *Reconstruction and Development Program*. African National Congress.

socioeconomic and structural realms) that could only be targeted through state-led economic transformation, distributive justice, and redress for historical injustice and inequality of groups disadvantaged under apartheid.

**ZIMBABWE:** Zimbabwe's CCIs (distribution and exercise of political power and the land question) have challenged peace agreements and the ability to forge an inclusive political settlement since the colonial era. While the 2008 GPA represented the first formal agreement that addressed these CCIs in a potentially transformative way, implementation has been hindered by reduced political will in the absence of power-sharing arrangements. During the GPA period modalities of political power were exploited by ZANU-PF partners in the government, including political violence, impunity, lack of rights and freedoms, and over-securitisation of the State. Despite convergence among the parties on the land question, which was strengthened during the power-sharing period, implementation has been slow. New problems and associated grievances are emerging such as the diminishing powers of traditional authorities, difficulties in accessing land in peri-urban areas, challenges in accessing restorative justice – the lack of funding and the complexities of the land issue are being increasingly entangled with mining. The popular support for the coup against Mugabe and his wife, illustrates widespread consensus across political divides around distribution and exercise of political power as a CCI.

**BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA:** CCIs (profound discrepancies between the boundaries of the political community and the rights of citizenship within that community and an ethnically based governance system) were addressed in the DPA in a way that satisfied each party's minimal demands and grievances. This however also set-up the conditions for nationalists' dominance during the agreement's implementation. Elites did not have an interest in resolving the ethnic governance issue because it would strip them of their power. As a result, the elite social contract involves the stubborn instrumental attachment to each party's respective nationalist political positions, and their electoral success is tightly connected to their nationalist political objectives.

**NEPAL:** The CPA sought to address Nepal's historic CCIs (political and economic exclusion) through a complete reform of the State, making it more inclusive and offering redress for longstanding oppression, neglect and discrimination based on caste, class, region and gender. However, the CPA did not succeed due to the failure of the Government to implement commitments, due to mistrust between the political parties, power struggles among them, and disagreement over the constitution of 2015, especially over electoral representation, constituency delineation, and citizenship-related clauses.

**SOUTH SUDAN:** The growing sense of ethnic and sub-national affiliation can largely be attributed to three CCIs (political power struggles, social exclusion, and economic inequality). These are all historical grievances held by different groups, as evidenced in the narratives of Southerners seeking secession. Successive agreements (before and after independence) that sought to address exclusion were dishonoured. South Sudan's CPA (2005-11) ultimately delivered a fragile nation that its new government was not able to unite, and the Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (2015) has been undermined by elites' self-interests.

**TUNISIA:** The Government's focus on political transition has neglected the economy and failed to address the CCIs (polarisation in society and economic desperation). The results are an untaxed and unregulated informal sector (now accounting for nearly 50% of the economy), a downgrading of the country's credit rating, several times since the revolution, and 40% of Tunisians out of work, a third of whom hold a university degree.<sup>22</sup> State subsidies of oil-and-gas products and foodstuffs has grown rapidly (by 270% during the difficult early transition years after the 2012 Constituent Assembly) and the tourism sector has been crippled as a result of terror attacks.<sup>23</sup> There is deep concern that the fragile democratic gains made since the revolution will be derailed.

<sup>22</sup> Gall, Carlotta. 2016. "Tunisia Seeks Foreign Investment to Cement Democratic Gains." *New York Times*, November 30, 2016. <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/30/world/africa/tunisia-investment-arab-spring.html>

<sup>23</sup> Ghiles, Francis. 2016. "Something is Rotten in the State of Tunisia." *Open Democracy*, January 29, 2016. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/north-africa-west-asia/francis-ghil-s/something-is-rotten-in-state-of-tunisia>

**Driver 2: Increasingly effective, fair, and inclusive institutions (both formal and informal and encompassing state, customary, other non-state, international) are performing key functions with broadly shared results.**

This research seeks to provide contextualised and comparative analysis of the different ways in which key services are being delivered, including on what actually matters to people in different contexts. Issues of performance, including the effectiveness of delivery and outcomes, especially for different groups, are explored. In addition, societies' expectations about the roles and functions of the state and its institutions, how these expectations change, and in relation to what factors, are considered. The research also looks at processes including the avenues for quality participation and for grievance recourse, such as the existence of, desire for, and effectiveness of these avenues. In considering how these issues affect societal understandings of the legitimacy of the state and its institutions, the authors were allowed to reflect on legitimacy in context, inspired by the OECD's four-pronged typology of legitimacy:<sup>24</sup> input/process; output/performance; shared beliefs; and, international legitimacy. Early findings include:

- **D2.1 State institutions, which can be seen as the hardware for carrying forward peace agreement implementation and in fostering more inclusive political settlements, are often not sufficiently or effectively engaged in addressing core conflict issues (CCIs), including at sub-national levels (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Cyprus, Nepal, South Africa, South Sudan, Tunisia, Yemen).**

Early findings from the case studies illustrate that this occurs through:

- The strengthening of institutions in ways that undermine or exacerbate CCIs, i.e. through the development of ethno-national, segregated, polarising institutions (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Yemen), or, by over-supporting security institutions without sufficient attention to developmental needs (Tunisia);
- Failing to link peace agreement commitments to formal governance institutions, especially at sub-national levels, or diluting commitments to do so (Colombia, Nepal, Tunisia, South Africa, Zimbabwe); and,
- Corruption and poor governance of institutions (South Africa, South Sudan, Zimbabwe).

**See also, examples in Driver 1, key message 2 [D1.2]**

**CYPRUS and BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA:** Ethno-national, separate institutions are perpetuating polarisation and discrimination, and moving both societies away from acquiring resilient national social contracts and achieving sustainable peace.

~ In **CYPRUS**, separate institutions are evolving over time, gaining legitimacy in the eyes of their own community while they perpetuate discriminating policies against the other community's members in their territory. Such policies include right to access property, freedom of movement and settlement, access to health care, voting rights and ethnic profiling at checkpoints. This means they are not addressing CCIs, nor power-sharing in ways that honour the vision of national institutions that respect all citizens' rights.

~ In **BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**, no attention was given to either the functionality of the institutions or, more generally, the implementation of the DPA. The new complex institutional structures went together with the creation of an unwieldy administrative apparatus. Not only has this system created an inefficient and corrupt economy, but it has also handed over the control of jobs in the bloated public sector to nationalist political parties, and established a large bureaucracy loyal to them.

<sup>24</sup> Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development. 2010. *The State's Legitimacy in Fragile Situations: Unpacking Complexity*. OECD, p 27.

**YEMEN:** Despite the NDC's best efforts in moving towards a more inclusive political settlement and agreed way forward, several hurdles exist in terms of implementation, namely the historic, chronic weakness of Yemen's political institutions. The NDC federalism proposal in theory brought government hardware into the picture but it was not well received, and it became a chief reason for the collapse of the NDC. In addition to the proposal introduction being made without sufficient warning, the regional districting that was to be conducted to implement the proposal was considered arbitrary, putting governorates that were not keen on cooperating within the same federal zones and not requiring buy-in from the leaders or their communities. Political actors in the NDC process failed to consider issues of social cohesion in considering how federalism could be beneficial to different regions and what co-operation would look like under such circumstances. The 2013 transitional government was ultimately viewed as complicit in stifling meaningful change and reinforcing the *status quo*. Ongoing pervasive corruption and mismanagement of basic service provision fostered a deep sense of exclusion and frustration by those who were affected by the institutional maladies of the state.

**TUNISIA:** Despite constitutional commitments to decentralisation, which entails greater localised budget autonomy, progress has been sluggish on the devolution of power from the national to sub-regional and municipal levels. Due to the failure to implement decentralisation measures, residents of the northern and interior regions continue to experience exclusion and neglect. While State institutions are making progress, particularly with regards to fighting corruption and strengthening education (and particularly civic education), there is concern that an overemphasis on security is working to the detriment of addressing the CCIs. The security budget has tripled, in order to fight terrorism, while many believe that different approaches (such as prevention-oriented economic incentives) may mitigate the very conditions that gave rise to terrorism, particularly in marginalised border communities.

**NEPAL:** Nepal saw a remarkable commitment to redressing historical exclusions and inequalities through the fostering of the norm of inclusion through representation during the CA-I elections of 2008, and through affirmative action policies and related political institutions that followed (i.e. through quotas in education, public employment and political representation), to addressing historical exclusions and inequalities. The second Constitutional Assembly (CA-II) election in 2013, however, saw the representation of the historically marginalised groups reduced. While this process drew up boundaries for seven states ending the centralised unitary state structure, the Madhesi and Tharu and other groups however, feel that the process was rushed through and diluted the commitments to meaningful federalism.

**SOUTH AFRICA:** Despite the notions of inclusiveness written into the Freedom Charter, and wider commitments voiced in post-transition development policies to alleviating the socio-economic deprivations of particular groups inherited from the apartheid past, parallel concessions agreed to during the transition have undermined these goals (see D1.1). Campaigning under the banner of "a better life for all," the 1994 Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP) sought to reconfigure the human rights abuses and inequalities as developmental priorities with some elements of reconstruction, particularly for local communities disenfranchised during apartheid. Yet the programme was criticised for lacking substance and the practical steps to achieve broadly outlined egalitarian objectives. The promotion of business through neo-liberal trade laws ultimately contributed to long-term economic instability and constrained the capacity of the State to implement pro-labour reform. While successful at articulating an inclusive institutional and policy framework, the challenges and technicalities of linking a nation-building agenda as represented in the political settlement, to broader policy reforms in employment and service delivery, were underestimated.

**ZIMBABWE:** With respect to the political question CCI (see D1.4), devolution, a Human Rights Commission, a Peace and Reconciliation Commission and an independent judiciary among others have been achieved on paper, but not in reality. With respect to the land question, a Land Commission to ensure transparency and fairness now exists. However, contradictions and challenges persist including perceptions that opposition

supporters were excluded. There are ongoing land occupations and even threats by ZANU-PF youths to occupy farms owned by some senior ZANU-PF politicians. Poor implementation of the GPA led to missed opportunities to utilise the land issue to redress grievances around fairness of process and results. Furthermore, an opportunity was missed to illustrate that institutions can deliver in ways that respond to society's expectations and build trust, and ultimately to build social cohesion between groups that feel marginalised through the process.

**COLOMBIA:** Colombia was already making important progress through state institutions in strengthening social and economic conditions before the peace agreement was signed, i.e. through improving accountability and fiscal capacity. However, extremely uneven urban-rural economic and political development has persisted despite ongoing decentralisation efforts since the 1980s. Local elites and illegal armed actors have dominated and captured regions and rents. This has produced various forms of hybridity, with national-level institutions – such as the tax system – competing for allegiance with sub-national, clientelistic networks – such as criminal and insurgent rent-seekers. Agreement implementation has largely been a national-level responsibility and endeavour. Sub-national authorities have been spectators or clients, more than proactive actors of transformation in their respective regions. As a result, it is unlikely that the agreement will have the desired effect of including rural and marginalised urban communities, for example in relation to their integration into regional and national networks for employment and production, access to quality healthcare and education services, representation and participation in the political process, and overcoming systemic inequality.

In **SOUTH SUDAN**, with power being handed over in 2011 to the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), with its weak institutions and strong ethnic and tribal affiliations, the smaller ethnic groups became increasingly excluded, and nepotism and patronage along ethnic lines became prevalent. When violent conflict erupted in the national capital Juba in 2013, it immediately assumed ethnic dimensions. As violent conflict continues unabated, these sub-national identities pose a threat to the unity of South Sudan. Weak institutions, combined with the SPLM's sense of exclusive entitlement to political power and economic resources, have resulted in rampant corruption. This has contributed to the lack of employment opportunities and limited the provision of basic services to the people.

- **D2.2 State Institutions (electoral bodies, administrative and social services, and institutions designed through peace agreements to address CCIs) are often not effectively delivering on their respective mandates (due to lack of political will, lack of capacity and resources, and corruption, all of which tend to reflect informal dynamics and power relations among actors at different levels) (All countries).**

All of the cases studies report dissatisfaction with state institutions and the delivery of public services. Data from the Fragile States Index on access to and adequacy of public service provision also strongly reflects this.

- **D2.3 Societies are reflecting deep concern about the effectiveness of state institutions (especially service delivery and related poverty and inequality, as well as wider government accountability) through protest, illustrating a lack of faith in official governance mechanisms (for grievance recourse and meaningful inclusion) (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Nepal, South Africa, Tunisia, Yemen, Zimbabwe).**

Early findings from the case studies illustrate that this occurs through:



- Expression of deep frustration with the state's ability to deliver basic services (all cases); and,
- The resorting to activism (Nepal, South Africa, Tunisia, Yemen), and even violence (Nepal, South Africa), as a means to exercise pressure upon the state, in the absence of responsive formal state mechanisms. However, repression and fear can circumscribe forms of protest and fuel more innovative approaches (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Zimbabwe).

Resistance measures such as protest can be viewed as an important indicator of expectations embedded in the social contract not being met. While protest illustrates societal willingness and capacity to make demands upon the state, it does not automatically suggest a resilient social contract. The latter depends on the nature of the state's response. Government responses are often not conducive to resolution, with the use of violence resulting in heightened civil society outcry (Nepal, South Africa, Tunisia) or a coup (Yemen). In other cases, government backlash creates fear of protesting (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Zimbabwe).

**YEMEN and TUNISIA:** In **YEMEN**, service delivery historically favoured regions with strong alliances to the state.<sup>25</sup> Marginalised communities developed their own systems and suffered further discrimination and violations at the hands of the state. The 2011 Arab Spring, which was led by multiple disenfranchised movements, sought to remedy institutional issues and bring reforms ensuring that all citizens would benefit equally and fairly from state institutions. Even as the political settlement process became more inclusive of political parties and civil society i.e. through the establishment of the NDC, Yemenis continued to register their discontent through protest, strikes and sit-ins. The Government's unresponsiveness to citizens' protests, including massive demonstrations against the removal of fuel subsidies in July 2014, created a wide national support base for the Houthi militia to intervene militarily. In **TUNISIA** grievances around the widening gap between people's expectations and the State's ability to deliver, resulting in economic disempowerment and exclusive development, gave rise to the strikes and demonstrations that fuelled the 2011 revolution.

**INNOVATIVE FORMS OF PROTEST, IN ZIMBABWE, SOUTH AFRICA and BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA:**

~ In **ZIMBABWE** protest in the streets have historically been violently repressed by the State. Public outcry over the lavish salaries, lifestyles, and public spending by elites has risen over the last decade. Displays of everyday resistance are consistent with apathy towards official platforms for citizen-state engagement. New forms of social organisation have emerged from the ever-expanding informal sector.

~ In **SOUTH AFRICA**, high levels of poverty and inequality have fuelled political protests and violent conflict, particularly pertaining to service delivery and at times xenophobic protests. Apartheid-era strategies are being revitalised by a wide range of marginalised actors who are challenging formal avenues of political expression, e.g. the #FeesMustFall student protests to check State misconduct, and protests about "land grabs" and "illegal occupations" relating to abuses of land and housing rights.<sup>26</sup> Initially, these engaged with formal structures and processes by approaching local councillors and other local government institutions for example. However, they escalated into collective mobilisation that has culminated in the destruction of property, vigilante justice, violent clashes with the police and, in recent years, xenophobic violence.

~In **BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**, grassroots and informal citizen groups have challenged ruling elites and their legitimacy, grounded in ethnic mistrust, by mobilising to demand change. The 2014 protests involving primarily

<sup>25</sup> The southern region was alienated after the North-South 1994 civil war causing a mounting sense of injustice. In a similar vein, the Zaydi areas of the North were marginalised after the 1968 revolution leading to the development of a strong support base for Zaydi elites whose self-governance made them a threat to the State.

<sup>26</sup> Omar, A. 2016. Social Contract Interview; Von Holdt, Karl, Malose Langa, Sepetla Molapo, Nomfundo Mogapi, Kindiza Ngubeni, Jacob Dlamini, and Adele Kirsten. 2011. *The Smoke that Calls: Insurgent Citizenship, Collective Violence and the Struggle for a Place in the New South Africa*. Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, Society, Work and Development Institute, July 28, 2016. Retrieved from <http://www.diversityjoy.nl/downloads/files/thesmokethatcalls.pdf>

areas in the Federation with a Bosniak majority, but supported by a majority of the population, regardless of ethnic background, were motivated by dubious post-war privatisation deals that resulted in heavy job losses and contributed to high unemployment rates, on top of already poor working conditions.<sup>27</sup> The 2014 protests were reported to have sparked a long-term shift in civic consciousness, including an increasing inclination to use violence to achieve political change.<sup>28</sup> Fear of losing jobs or facing financial penalties made the anti-government momentum difficult to maintain. The widespread practice of *štela* – the locally accepted practice of granting and receiving favours or bribes – also highlights people's self-reliance in the absence of effective public institutions.

**NEPAL:** The eruption of violence in following the passing of the 2015 Constitution also illustrated deep frustrations with the State's inability to address the political, economic and social exclusion of particular groups. Madhesis and Tharus living in the southern part of Nepal (Tarai region) launched a prolonged agitation from September 2015 until February 2016 against the implementation of the new Constitution, which they felt marginalised the Tarai community. They argued that the constitution eroded their political representation, reframed citizenship provisions and gerrymandered federal provinces in a way which hurt the interests of the Madhesi and Tharus people. The protests resulted in the death of at least 50 people, with violence stemming from protesters and the Government alike. Many in Nepal blame India (who have a Madhesi minority) for quietly supporting the Madhesi protesters; a charge New Delhi denies.

**COLOMBIA:** Popular protests have increased in recent years. All protests have been related to unsolved problems with the State's provisions of basic services, from the failure to address challenges in the agrarian sector, in the public education sector, and with infrastructure. In the aftermath of the 2016 referendum, which handed victory to the critics of the agreement due to the "no" vote, a series of massive demonstrations took place in support of adjusting the agreement and protecting the progress that had already been achieved (as reflected in declining levels of violence).

- **D2.4 Customary, informal and other non-state structures and systems are commonly playing important, though at times contested, institutional functions, particularly at sub-national levels, yet are often not officially or systematically integrated into an inclusive political settlement (Colombia, South Sudan, Yemen, Zimbabwe).**

In many countries, especially in transitional but also developing country contexts, customary authorities (i.e. kinship-based and religious authorities, chieftainships), and other non-state actors with strong constituencies, (i.e. associations linked to insurgent groups), hold the allegiance of local populations and may be playing key institutional functions (i.e. delivering services in the absence of, or in protest against, the state). Their inclusion in political agreements, linked institutions and policies, is important to ensure implementation and wider effective governance.

Early findings from the case studies illustrate that:

- Customary structures and other parallel institutions that have evolved through conflict to represent local populations, often hold considerable (but also uneven) support. This is true given their proximity to local populations, and because the state may be absent and lacking capacity and/or legitimacy (Colombia,

<sup>27</sup> Authorities in the Serb Republic were able to avoid similar events by presenting protesters as enemies of their government and by repressing internal dissent.

<sup>28</sup> Cera Murtagh. 2016. "Civic Mobilization in Divided Societies and the Perils of Political Engagement: Bosnia and Herzegovina's Protest and Plenum Movement." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 22 (2): 149-171.

South Sudan, Yemen, Zimbabwe). Support for these structures and institutions can be uneven for reasons including their co-opting by particular groups, or the state itself (Zimbabwe), and their potential to promote conservative norms that conflict with human rights and other norms, i.e. women's equality (Yemen); and,

- They are often side-lined in political processes, particularly at the national level, even where commitments to inclusive political settlements are in place (Colombia, South Sudan, Yemen, Zimbabwe).

- **D2.5 State legitimacy (and how societal expectations factor into this), which is multi-dimensional given the many variables (historical, cultural, social, economic and political) at play, often relates to citizen perspectives around service provision, corruption, avenues for participation and delivery on promises** (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, South Africa, Tunisia, Yemen, Zimbabwe).

Early findings from the case studies support the emerging literature on rebuilding/strengthening of state legitimacy in countries affected by conflict and fragility, which suggest it is highly context specific, and that many narratives exist. They are also in general agreement with the ODI findings around complexity with respect to service delivery, expectations of the state and satisfaction (that causal linkages are not clear). This study's findings however, are emerging as more mixed on the assumption that how well services are run is more important than access (and moreover, there is a case to be made that these are not really de-linkable). Notably, our findings suggest that:

- Citizens generally do want the state to deliver services (as evidenced by protests across countries (see D2.3), although expectations can be dimmed (or lost) through negative experience of the state *vis-a-vis* the delivery of services (poor or non-existent, discriminatory, rent-seeking), (South Africa, Zimbabwe);
- Populations can recognise multiple forms of legitimacy with respect to government. While one form of legitimacy might weaken (e.g. around service delivery performance), another can be sustained (e.g. shared beliefs with charismatic leaders), or strengthened in the context of political processes (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Zimbabwe); and,
- Involvement of international actors and the allegiance to international norms can undermine or enhance the legitimacy of local institutions (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, South Africa, Tunisia, Yemen, Zimbabwe; See 5.1 for more details).

***Driver 3: There is broadening and deepening social cohesion – understood as the formal and informal ties that hold society together both horizontally (across and between citizens and groups) and vertically (in the relations between citizens and groups, and the state).***

*In “driver 3” on social cohesion, the research examines the ways that people bond between and across political, economic and social spheres, at different levels and in different settings i.e. vertically, and horizontally. This research aims to explore how these interact, drive and/or undermine one another, contributing to conflict and peace. Here it is considered what domains are most important and why, in different contexts, across three prominent areas: 1) belonging and identification; 2) trust and respect; and, 3) access, participation and representation. Early findings include:*

- **D3.1 Vertical social cohesion (relations between the state, and some groups and citizens) is not strong in the case studies, which helps explain the weakness of national social contracts** (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Nepal, South Africa, South Sudan, Tunisia, Yemen, Zimbabwe).

Considering vertical social cohesion (through the following three domains: 1) belonging and identification; trust and respect; and, 3) access, participation and representation), early findings from the case studies illustrate that

poor vertical cohesion, evidenced through opinion polls and surveys, low voter turnout, protest, and measures of public participation, occurs through:

- Poor progress in Driver 1 (achieving a more inclusive political settlement that increasingly addresses core conflict issues); and,
- Poor progress in Driver 2, including declining trust in states and their institutions, and/or dissatisfaction with performance (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Cyprus, Nepal, South Africa, South Sudan, Tunisia, Yemen, Zimbabwe). Notably this is linked with forging a common national identity (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Nepal, South Africa, South Sudan, Yemen).

Vertical cohesion appears to benefit from strong national identity (Zimbabwe), regardless of poor state performance, including when formal channels of communication between citizens and the state exist (Tunisia).

**ZIMBABWE:** A mixed picture is evident in Zimbabwe. People tend to ally with a national identity before an ethnic one (though not always). Perhaps this is a result of absorbing the nationalist vision. Zimbabwean citizens poll high in believing the State should be obeyed, yet not in trusting state institutions, nor in engaging their leaders at different levels. They also poll high in dissatisfaction with service delivery (which has worsened since the GPA).<sup>29</sup> The contradictions might be explained by fear of state violence, and the belief that actions will not produce results. The 2017 mass uprising in support of a coup to topple the now former President Mugabe illustrate this point. Once the coup leaders (Zimbabwe's military) allowed the protest to take place, tens of thousands of Zimbabweans, across the political divides, seized the opportunity and went into the streets.

While in **CYPRUS**, the vertical cohesion, while increasingly present within each community separately, is almost non-existent across the two communities. Given the solidification of two separate ethno-national social contracts, in **BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**, despite the presence of nationalist institutions, the situation is more complex. Bosnians display a low attachment level to both their homeland and their (State) citizenship, but with some significant differences between groups.<sup>30</sup> As such, Bosnian nationality does not constitute an identity for all citizens (reflecting the core conflict issue over political boundaries, and allegiance to neighbouring Croatia and Serbia). Trust towards institutions has decreased considerably since 2008, when a Gallup poll found that 70.3% of citizens had little or no trust in government.<sup>31</sup> In addition, almost nine out of ten citizens, with no significant variation between different ethnic groups, believe that political elites represent the major problem in the country.<sup>32</sup> The distance between citizens and the formal peace implementation process is reflected in the general lack of interest at the popular level in constitutional issues, the technicalities related to the implementation of the DPA, and the low level of interest in politics in general (best reflected in the decline in voter turnout over the years).

**SOUTH AFRICA:** Despite the strong *rainbowism* discourse (which draws from the common refrain of the "Rainbow Nation" used to describe post-apartheid South Africa), in "recognising the historical obligation for redress," and amending the divisions wrought by settler colonialism, the efforts spearheading this national project have focused on sports and recreation, failing to adequately address the structural drivers of inequality. *Ubuntu* (a term for a "shared sense of humanity") enjoys high support, but amounts to a superficial approach

<sup>29</sup> Afrobarometer.

<sup>30</sup> 82% of Bosniaks privilege the fact of being a Bosnia and Herzegovina citizen, followed by 60% of Croats. By contrast, for Serbs their ethnic identity is most important. United Nations Resident Coordinator's Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 2015. *Public Opinion Poll Results*. Sarajevo: UN, p45 Ringdal, Kristen, Ola Listhaug and Albert Simkus. 2013. "Bosnian Values in a European Context." In Ola Listhaug and Sabrina P. Ramet, eds., 137-157, *Bosnia-Herzegovina Since Dayton. Civic and Uncivic Values*. Longo: Ravenna.

<sup>31</sup> Report available at [www.gallup.com](http://www.gallup.com).

<sup>32</sup> United Nations Resident Coordinator's Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 2015. *Public Opinion Poll Results*. Sarajevo: UN, p15.

to social cohesion that some fear is vulnerable to political capture by the ruling ANC. The trust of the population in State institutions is declining in the post-political settlement era.<sup>33</sup>

**NEPAL:** Nepal is a multi-lingual, multi-racial, multi-cultural and multi-religious nation State that has yet to forge a common identity and common destiny. In Nepal, there is a great deal of state-driven discrimination based on socially-constructed hierarchies, values and beliefs. These prevent some groups from performing certain activities or from participating in the public arena. The issues of ethnic, religious and caste identities, natural resource use and distribution, and political differences and divisions, have resulted in a lack of social cohesion and threaten to disrupt the (limited) social cohesion that has emerged from the political settlement.

**COLOMBIA:** Colombians have a strong national identity but are cynical and critical of national state capacity, in part due to the ineffectiveness of State institutions (characterised by low performance, widespread impunity and corruption). There is little engagement in politics and a general dislike of formal democratic institutions (such as political parties and Congress). The Colombian population's satisfaction with democracy has declined since 2004. Trust in the government has also declined between 2004 and 2010.<sup>34</sup>

**TUNISIA:** Tapping into Tunisia's reservoir of citizen-driven, social cohesion has not only helped to avoid violence during the transition but has also ensured a more inclusive public dialogue throughout the policymaking process, thus reducing public scepticism about new laws and plans, increasing buy in, and aiding implementation of laws that are passed. Citizen-driven, social cohesion has also helped to empower ordinary people, transforming them from subjects into citizens. Active channels of communication between citizens and the State, i.e. through service provision and by joining international open governance initiatives, have also increased trust and respect for the State. However, despite the inclusive nature of Tunisia's transition, a survey conducted as part of this study revealed a widespread disengagement with national politics, as more and more Tunisians question whether the Government can deliver the promises of the revolution. This trend is predominant in young people (aged 18-25), a majority of whom did not vote in the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections. The results of a survey of young people reveal high levels of youth dissatisfaction: 42% are dissatisfied with the provision of justice and the rule of law; 45% with public service and state institutions; and, 50% with efforts to address the economy and poverty.

**YEMEN:** Because the Government is operating in a volatile environment and is incapable of providing basic services to its citizens, various groups have become increasingly confrontational regarding its authority. The Southerners unwavering demands for secession and the Houthis' removal of the transitional President Hadi (on the basis of corruption and mismanagement of Yemen's affairs and resources), demonstrates a deep fracture between the State and society. Much of this mistrust is driven by the institutional weakness of the State and its continued appeasement of patrimonial networks, both old and new. At the national level, 35.2% believe that the Yemeni army does not work enough to fight terrorism in Yemen.<sup>35</sup> As described in D2.4, many Yemenis place their trust in customary authorities.

**SOUTH SUDAN:** The survey for this study revealed low citizen trust in formal institutions and a sense of disempowerment, including in terms of participation in political processes, followed independence. This is

<sup>33</sup> 12% trusted the courts "a lot" in 2000, a figure which peaked at 35% in 2004 and has declined steadily again to 24% in 2015, while 9% trusted the police "a lot" in 2000, peaking at 28% in 2004, and declining at a similar rate to the courts, to 14% in 2015. Sibusiso, N. 2016. *South Africa's social cohesion – inequality, interpersonal/institutional trust, identity and tolerance: Findings from Afrobarometer's Round 6 surveys in South Africa*. Presented at the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Nation Building and Social Cohesion Workshop, Cape Town: June.

<sup>34</sup> Observatorio de la Democracia. 2014. *Democracia e Instituciones*. [https://obsdemocracia.org/temas-de-estudio/democracia-e-instituciones/tendencias?question\\_id=9106&year\\_from=2004&year\\_to=2016#js\\_topic\\_graphic](https://obsdemocracia.org/temas-de-estudio/democracia-e-instituciones/tendencias?question_id=9106&year_from=2004&year_to=2016#js_topic_graphic)

<sup>35</sup> Yemen Polling Centre.

attributed to the centralised system of governance adopted after independence in 2011. In terms of civil-military relations, the relationship between the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and citizens deteriorated and soured after independence in 2011. The lack of a national vision for forging a unified national identity, coupled with weak institutions, resulted in the strengthening of sub-national affiliations after independence.

- **D3.2 Horizontal social cohesion tends to be stronger within groups than between them, and weaker when political issues (rather than ethnic or religious issues) are dominant** (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Cyprus, Nepal, South Africa, Tunisia, Yemen, Zimbabwe).

Considering horizontal social cohesion (through domains of belonging and identification, trust and respect, and access, participation and representation), early findings from our case studies illustrate that this occurs through:

- horizontal social cohesion being stronger within groups, than between them, reflecting polarisation trends with an elite driven component (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Yemen, Zimbabwe);
- daily interactions between groups, such as living as neighbours. These are often not a problem, while political issues tend to provoke, catalyse, and/or enhance group divisions, whether by design or chance. This is the case especially where there are perceptions that some groups are favoured by the state, over others (Colombia, South Africa, South Sudan, Yemen, Zimbabwe); and,
- state designed horizontal cohesion initiatives not being very effective (South Africa, Zimbabwe, while citizen-initiated ones seem to hold promise (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nepal, Tunisia).

**ZIMBABWE:** There is fairly strong horizontal cohesion in Zimbabwe. At an interpersonal level, 93%-94% of Zimbabweans would “strongly like,” “somewhat like,” or “not care” about living as neighbours of people of different religions/ethnic groups. This suggests that the main fault lines are partly political. Rather, ethnic and tribal differences tend to manifest through policy choices, access to services, and allocations of position in political parties. There is a sense that some ethnic groups are prioritised over others.

**BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA:** Surveys indicate that the distance between ethnic groups does not play an important role in people's lives, but it continues to be important in political relations and decisions. While forms of social cohesion in Bosnia and Herzegovina remain predominantly intra-ethnic, and opinion polls show how social trust is particularly low in heterogeneous municipalities, some actors favour the development of greater cross-ethnic linkages and co-operation. At the same time, ethnic identity is still politically mobilised; nationalist politicians effectively utilise each group's separate “politics of memory” in the pursuit their political priorities. Beyond the State, citizen-led economic and social co-operation facilitate forms of constructive interaction and sharing, despite difficult economic conditions. Workers across national groups are developing new forms of solidarity in the fight for their rights, as evidence by the Bosnia and Herzegovina Commerce and Services Trade Union-drawing members from both administrative entities – the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Serb Republic.

The roles that **DIASPORAS** play in horizontal cohesion, as with vertical cohesion, arise in important ways across cases but require further examination and reflection. In **ZIMBABWE**, for example, though diasporas play an important economic role (in terms of remittances), they are excluded from political processes, and are thus less inclined to co-operate with the ruling party-led State. In **BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**, the diaspora contributes to financial flows, transfer of knowledge, technology, and human capital. They also play an increasing role in social service provision which has implications for the vertical dimension of the state-citizen social contract. Focus groups pointed to the diaspora as a potentially positive player whose influence, however, is hindered by

both the lack of responsiveness of local politicians, and by the lack of clear legal avenues for diaspora to participate fully in Bosnian political, economic and social life.

**CYPRUS:** Given the solidification of two separate ethno-national social contracts, horizontal and vertical cohesion, while increasingly present within each community internally, is almost non-existent across the two communities. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, driven by negative stereotypes of the other along with perceptions of injustice due to institutional discrimination, experience inter-communal relations that, under a superficial veneer of civility, are characterised by deep mistrust.

**YEMEN:** Trust and respect among some groups worsened considerably after the Arab Spring. At this time, Southern Yemenis who had suffered from discriminatory policies and were collectively punished and oppressed following the civil war of 1994, retaliated against their Northern neighbours after the ouster of their oppressive government. This created an unsafe and hostile environment for Northerners in the South. Similarly, the Houthi rebels who had suffered a decade of prejudice against their identity and ideology at the hands of other Yemeni groups, retaliated with confrontation and violence as their power increased. Ultimately, inter-communal relations remained volatile and sub-national identities gained paramount importance for the majority of groups, since many groups felt they were unable to trust that the central government would treat them fairly or consider needs and interests. The NDC did not, problematically, concern itself with repairing and fostering horizontal social cohesion.

**SOUTH SUDAN:** Most of the key informants in this study considered that the level of trust and respect between different ethnic groups was stronger during the transition period of the CPA (46%) than after independence (13%) in 2011. Despite this, daily interactions between groups were recognised by most key informants (62%) to be helpful in reducing fear, anxiety, mistrust and negative stereotypes. In gauging the perception of respondents in relation to what would make them identify with being more South Sudanese than being members of their tribes, national elements (49%) and ethnic elements (41%) played an almost equal role in projecting national identity and the feeling of “Southernness.”<sup>36</sup>

**SOUTH AFRICA:** Horizontal social cohesion presents a mixed picture. While 92% of South Africans embrace the spirit of *ubuntu*,<sup>37</sup> such a commitment to non-violence and humanism has done little for South African women. South African women suffer some of the highest income inequality in the world, and 1 in 5 women will be victims of sexual violence during their lifetimes. Trust in fellow citizens is declining<sup>38</sup> and perceptions that race relations are improving are declining.<sup>39</sup> There is some evidence of inter-racial socialisation, but it is primarily limited to middle income and wealthy South Africans. There is not much faith in initiatives promoting social cohesion, since they do not address the power dynamics between groups, which underlie structural inequalities.

**COLOMBIA:** Violence, aggression, and distrust is high among Colombians, in contrast with other Latin American countries, probably as a consequence of the protracted civil war. This represents a challenge for national reconciliation. While research points to victims and perpetrators as having a pragmatic approach to living with

<sup>36</sup> Author's own survey conducted for this study.

<sup>37</sup> De Kock, Petrus. 2016. *South African 2015 Domestic Perception Survey*. Presented at the Nation Building and Social Cohesion Workshop, Cape Town: June.

<sup>38</sup> A survey, run from 2000 to 2011, asked South Africans, “, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you must be very careful in dealing with people?” The figure answering, “must be very careful” has grown from 76% in 2000 to 81% in 2011. Sibusiso, N. 2016. *South Africa's social cohesion – inequality, interpersonal/institutional trust, identity and tolerance: Findings from Afrobarometers Round 6 surveys in South Africa*. Presented at the DAC Nation Building and Social Cohesion Workshop, Cape Town: June.

<sup>39</sup> Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation. 2014. *Development Indicators 2014*. Republic of South Africa.

others,<sup>40</sup> members of the general population reveal low levels of trust in former combatants. For example, 45% of the general population was unwilling to have demobilized fighters as neighbours.<sup>41</sup> Trust of ex-combatant is also low in politics. Despite the low levels of horizontal social cohesion reflected in practice, Colombians are optimistic about the results of demobilization. This is reflected in a 2016 survey in which the majority of respondents expected demobilisation to result in a more inclusive society (49.2%) and to see an increase in tolerance (46.1%).

**TUNISIA:** There is social mistrust among citizen groups, largely delineated by region, as people from the North are mistrustful of people from the coast – the latter who have disproportionately benefitted from the State's investments in tourism and infrastructure. The level of tolerance between different ethnic, linguistic, religious, and socioeconomic groups within the country is measured to be 3.1 out of 5, which is the same as Colombia and 0.1 higher than Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>42</sup> Continuing economic disempowerment and unequitable development continue to fuel these sentiments, as employment opportunities for young people are scarce and education is generally regarded as disconnected from the skills needed for the job market. Still, the active vigilance and creative contributions of a number of NGOs (non-governmental organisations), women's organisations, and citizen networks are positive examples in a generally poor governance landscape (see D3.1).

**NEPAL:** Inter-ethnic discrimination as a result of the caste system continues to this day, including entrenched gender subordination. However, the 2015 earthquake resulted in a sense of solidarity and mutual support among neighbours and an outpouring of goodwill from the international community. Unlike in similar disasters elsewhere, there were no major incidents of looting, pilfering of humanitarian aid, violence or breakdowns of law and order.

## Cross-cutting Issues

### EXCLUSION AND INCLUSION

- **4.1 Inclusive processes do not automatically or quickly tend to lead to inclusive results, given the potential for other intervening factors (political will, misuse of power, capacity and resources, poor design and/or process, poor or lacking implementation frameworks)** (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Nepal, South Africa, Yemen, Zimbabwe).

The emerging consensus on the value of inclusive political settlements and peace processes more broadly, being deeply connected to sustaining peace, is welcome. This research looks at inclusion and exclusion through the three above drivers, at different phases and levels of transition, with attention to process and results – both substantive policy results or institutional practices, and, implementation of these to produce more inclusive outcomes.

<sup>40</sup> Daily relationships among these groups are generally peaceful, although marked by past experiences of conflict and economic precariousness. Prieto, Juan Diego. 2012. "Together after war while the war goes on: Victims, ex-combatants and communities in three Colombian cities." *International Journal of Transitional Justice*, 6(3):525-546.

<sup>41</sup> Of the general population, a similar percentage (around 45%) would let their children attend the same schools as the children of demobilised paramilitary members or guerrillas, or would give former guerrillas a job. This contrasts with 79% of respondents who would let their children share their school with victims. To be neighbours of demobilised fighters would be acceptable to 36% of the population (in contrast with 83% for victims). (Survey done by study's author).

<sup>42</sup> Positive Peace Index 2015.



Early findings from the case studies illustrate that translating inclusive processes into sustained, inclusive results requires time. In addition, in support of other research findings, it requires steadfast commitment to ensure processes target and create policies that are then implemented.<sup>43</sup> Tunisia illustrates how a commitment to forging an inclusive social contract through myriad, in particular citizen-driven processes for greater inclusion (of different groups and citizens generally), is producing substantive results and meaningful outcomes. This includes processes across social contract-making spheres and mechanisms, as well as sectors.

Challenges in transmission between inclusive processes and results occurs because of the following:

- A lack of political will and/or abuse of power (Zimbabwe, South Africa, Colombia);
- Poor, unsupportive processes and/or superficial commitments (Yemen, Zimbabwe);
- Commitment to quotas being undermined by politics (Bosnia and Herzegovina, South Africa); and,
- Violent backlashes (Nepal) not translating into envisaged results.

Finding D1.1 discusses how the early stages of peace negotiations offer possibilities for redefining parameters for inclusion and exclusion, and positioning of different groups. In some cases, this has catalysed more inclusive politics (**TUNISIA, NEPAL, SOUTH AFRICA, COLOMBIA**). Yet concrete results can be difficult to sustain, particularly if power-sharing does not remain in place (**YEMEN and TUNISIA**).

D1.3 Illustrates the propensity for exclusion to manifest in different ways, as a CCI (**SOUTH AFRICA, NEPAL, BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, COLOMBIA**). Manifesting large scale policy change to produce transformative inclusive results to provide redress for serious horizontal, regional, rural/urban inequalities requires a supportive governance and policy environment. This can be blocked or undermined by competing concessions in transitional agreements (**SOUTH AFRICA, ZIMBABWE, COLOMBIA**), as illustrated in D1.4.

**YEMEN:** Despite the push for an all-inclusive institutional process, positive results did not materialise due to the short timeline of the NDC coupled with corruption, poor governance, and human rights violations. The process was hasty, recommendations rushed and parties were unable to come to a consensus at the end of the dialogue. In reality, ‘inclusion’ was little more than window-dressing that maintained the modus operandi of the dysfunctional state. While the NDC is widely considered to be highly inclusive of delegates from different political parties, regions and social groups, the NDC failed to consider sub-national elites, local council members, and a representative parliamentary and civil society that represents disadvantaged communities. These are vital players in ensuring societal buy-in at all levels.

**NEPAL:** The CPA promised a complete reform of the State in a direction it called “progressive,” making it more inclusive and offering redress for what it described as oppression, neglect and discrimination based on caste, class, region and gender, including against Dalit, Janajati and Madhesi groups and women. However, it is unclear that the new political institutions at national and local levels will prove resilient over time. There continue to be deep-seated grievances, ethnic mobilisation and divisive political mobilisation that undermine the resilience of the newly emerging social contract. The post-transition political institutions remain fragile. In particular, the lack of state effectiveness and responsiveness in the development and security sectors means that a ‘New Nepal’ remains elusive.

**SOUTH AFRICA:** Integrated Development Plans were designed to foster collaborative governance that includes multiple actors (the State, business, labour, and civil society) working locally to implement national policies to deliver services and address grievances. However, unresponsiveness and inaccessibility of local councillors and

<sup>43</sup> Donais, Timothy and Erin McCandless. 2016. “International Peacebuilding and the Emerging Inclusivity Norm,” *Third World Quarterly*, 38(2).

associated grievances has often led to community mobilisation, and sometimes violence and the destruction of property, as a strategy to garner media attention and a response from the State.

The use of **QUOTAS** can encounter challenges in transmitting intentions into results, and in some cases, result in a deepening politicisation of identity. In **BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**, the quota system (which designates a set number of elected seats in political and administrative positions to each ethnic group) has created an inefficient and corrupt economy, handed over the control of jobs in the bloated public sector to nationalist political parties, and established a large bureaucracy loyal to them. This has supported the development of a degree of acquiescence and apathy among the general population, whose well-being frequently depends upon political parties' handing out of jobs, perks and benefits. In **NEPAL**, the State has sought to foster more inclusive institutions since the restoration of democracy in 1990. The Interim Constitution of 2007 validated affirmative action as a matter of fundamental rights. Groups that traditionally had been marginalised or excluded from state power (ethnic and religious groups, but not women) were designated for proportional inclusion, mostly through quotas ('reservations'), in education, public employment and political representation. While existing problems are not resolved completely, new issues have emerged, most notably around the core demands of a federal structure, power sharing and amendments to the 2015 Constitution. In **SOUTH AFRICA**, advances in gender equality are occurring through measures to increase the percentage of women in legislative representation (24.5% in 1994, to 42.5% in 2014), but this has not translated into meaningful results in relation to inequality and Gender-Based Violence (GBV). Thus, while 92% of South Africans embrace the spirit of *ubuntu*, according to the 2015 Brand SA (South Africa) study, such a commitment to non-violence and humanism has done little for South African women. They suffer some of the highest income inequality in the world and more than 1 in 5 will be the victims of sexual violence during their lifetime.<sup>44</sup>

**TUNISIA:** Tunisia can claim to have pulled together the most progressive rights and freedoms of any constitution in the Arab world, both in terms of the rights-oriented content and the inclusiveness of the processes that gave birth to it (see D1.2). It has already served as a critical point of reference in settling tensions and disputes, given the broad-based legitimacy it enjoys. Still, the framers of the new constitution did not abolish all forms of discrimination against women, particularly on issues of inheritance and child custody. These matters are still governed by sharia law, although rights advocates and women's associations are turning their attention to these issues now. Following the revolution and the adoption of the 2014 Constitution, citizens are more aware of their rights and responsibilities that enable them to participate in the creation of a more inclusive social contract, notably through an awareness of their duty to stand for their rights and challenge the Government. Tunisians continue to call for more inclusion and to institutionalise citizen engagement. This will continue to be done through informal institutions, as long as state institutions are still new, or perceived as incompetent or untrustworthy.

## INTERNATIONAL ACTORS AND ISSUES

- **5.1 While the international community plays vital supporting roles to countries in transition, at times positions taken to support peace agreements and the social contract-making mechanisms that follow, can inadvertently undermine the ability to transformatively address core conflict issues** (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Cyprus, Nepal, South Africa, Tunisia, Yemen, Zimbabwe).

This research is intentionally focused on national actors and processes, and thus does not seek to identify international actors' promising or problematic practices. This is consistent with the international community's

<sup>44</sup> De Kock, 2016.

expressed intention to support the national ownership of peacebuilding, statebuilding, development and the social contract. Some findings emerged in relation to the three drivers around the roles of international actors in the processes of political settlement that are noteworthy.

These early findings support much of the familiar critiques in the existing literature including that:

- International Financial Institution (IFI) policy requirements of member states often serve to undermine political settlement commitments (South Africa, Zimbabwe); and,
- International actors are perceived as non-neutral, and/or fuelling conflict dynamics in the way particular processes are promoted or facilitated (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Cyprus, Nepal, Yemen).

**ZIMBABWE and SOUTH AFRICA:** Both Zimbabwe and South Africa illustrate the international community's enforcement of IFI conditions, in ways that undermined the ability of the government to meet political settlement commitments needed to transform the economy and social relations. In **SOUTH AFRICA**, the ANC departed from the Freedom charter to align with IFI conditions. In **ZIMBABWE**, the insistence by the IFIs on structural adjustment policies less than a decade after independence undermined Mugabe's ability to transform the economy, particularly in the context of highly unequal distribution of land and resources – a situation not effectively addressed in the 1980 Lancaster House Agreement that ushered in Zimbabwe's independence.

**CYPRUS:** “Europeanisation of the Cyprus problem” could have provided an opportunity to bridge the two rival sub-national social contracts. Instead it created a triangle of dissonance between them, in its failure to treat the Turkish Cypriot social contract as legitimate, and its failure to foster an inclusive approach. Positively, the desire for greater acceptance by the international community (European Union (EU) membership for Greek Cypriots, greater international recognition for Turkish Cypriots) reinforces each community's recognition that they cannot persist with discriminatory institutions (towards the other community's members).

**NEPAL:** International involvement was pivotal, but lacking in scale, scope, consistency and results. For example, a United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) special mission to assist in CPA implementation was denied enforcement capacity by the Nepali government, and thereby limited to drawing attention to unfulfilled commitments and urging political parties to honour them. This mission eventually withdrew. In addition, while federalism was not an international donor-driven agenda, donors such as the UN and International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) worked to support marginalised groups (addressing the CCI), facilitating dialogue and providing technical expertise on policy and legal options. This affected their neutrality in the eyes of the Government and caused a backlash.

**COLOMBIA:** International actors have played diverse roles in relation to the armed conflict. The country has been an ally of the United State of America (US) in the region for decades. The US War on Drugs has impacted Colombia's peace process in varied ways. On the one hand, a huge military package known as Plan Colombia aimed to fight drugs but equipped the Colombian armed forces sufficiently to enable them to turn the tide against the guerrillas. This turned public opinion in favour of the State and facilitated the initiation of talks. On the other hand, the emphasis on eradication of coca – directly related to the US mandate – has curtailed Government autonomy in pursuing an approach that might yield more effective developmental results, e.g. through emphasis on alternative crops and sources of income. At the same time, the internally-backed institutional scaffolding for peace, buttressing the nationally-driven peace process, is valued by Colombians.

**BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA:** Despite the fact that international actors have frequently clashed with local nationalists, they have guaranteed the ethnically-based political order which emerged in the aftermath of the

war. Many civil society actors, who depend on funding from political elites and international donors, are, to a significant extent, part of this elite social contract.

**YEMEN:** The international and regional community played a leading role in assisting Yemen to design the process of the NDC and extended technical assistance when necessary. Much of the NDC process was designed and heavily mentored by these external actors.<sup>45</sup> However, three fundamental problems were evident: firstly, external actors were heavily invested in the success of the NDC, so much so that any objective criticism about the process (such as the lack of horizontal cohesion between the groups) was dismissed and not taken into account; secondly, regional actors' desires to influence Yemen's internal affairs were largely driven by security concerns and fears of a sectarian Shia/Zaydi spill-over outside of Yemen's borders; and, thirdly, pushing a limited time frame (six months) to achieve a political settlement through the NDC, repeated mistakes of the past i.e. a similarly hasty effort during the 1990 unification that unwittingly sparked conflict issues leading to the 1994 civil war.

**TUNISIA:** External support to the process was instrumental for the writing of Tunisia's 2014 Constitution, including numerous symposia on constitution-making, highlighting historical and contemporary lessons, that were hosted by local NGOs with the support of external donors. Technical and financial support from external actors proved crucial to completing the momentous task. At the same time, international funding and assistance has largely, and increasingly focused on security in the context of concern for extremism in the region. This has tended to compete for and crowd out limited peace and development funds. The approach of the international community on strengthening the state, given lessons elsewhere, also requires sensitivity in the context of Tunisia's authoritarian history.

## RESILIENT SOCIAL CONTRACTS AND SUSTAINING PEACE

*While the topic of sustainable peace has long held value, it has always suffered from a lack of policy consensus around meaning and approach. There is revitalised energy brought with the new global agendas on sustaining peace and conflict prevention and the Agenda for Transformation 2030. This study aims to support thinking around core priorities for sustaining peace within these agendas, notably, on the role of addressing root causes, building national visions, and fostering inclusion around key issues in order to drive peace forward.*

*While there has been much investigation into state-society relations on the one hand, and evolving social cohesion research on the other, insufficient attention has been paid to how processes linked to building trust and more peaceful relationships and ensuring inclusivity, relate to substantive agreements being kept. Less is known about how these transmit into results (e.g. considering institutions and policies that concretely address grievances that led to conflict in the first place, and/or that provide ongoing and trusted means for addressing grievances). Making and measuring progress on sustaining peace requires thoughtful, engaged reflection that is rooted in rigorous examination of particular cases, focusing on the linkages, interactions and outcomes of these processes. This is what this research aims to achieve through the framework of the three drivers and examination of cross-cutting issues.*

### ➤ 6.1 What is needed to achieve a more resilient national social contract, and move countries on a path to sustaining peace?

<sup>45</sup> External actors refers to the "Friends of Yemen," which encompassed the neighbouring Gulf states, the US, the EU, the UK, and other bilateral and multilateral donors.

~ *Virtuous movement of each of these three drivers (all countries), and virtuous interaction of the drivers (Cyprus, Tunisia, Yemen, Zimbabwe).*

~ *CCIs attended to, in and through social contract-making spheres and mechanisms, in inclusive ways (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Nepal, South Sudan, Yemen, Zimbabwe).*

~ *Resilience capacities in society, mobilised and supported, towards peace (Cyprus, Nepal, South Africa, Yemen, Zimbabwe).*

Early findings from the case studies illustrate (**both through positive and negative experience**) that important elements for moving a country towards a resilient social contract likely include:

- Virtuous movement of each of these drivers, as findings within each of the three drivers suggest;
- Understanding how the interactions of drivers can move a transition in better directions (e.g. Tunisia) or worse (e.g. vicious cycles of cascading failure across the three drivers such as in Cyprus, Yemen, Zimbabwe), and, promoting the former while working to prevent the latter;
- Giving steadfast attention to addressing CCI through different social contract-making spheres and mechanisms by ensuring that:
  - Political settlements are rooted in official, transparent, and inclusive agreements that accurately articulate and set out to address CCI, with power-sharing to enforce implementation (Yemen, Zimbabwe);
  - Constitutions are in place and supported, with clear provisions that support agreed movement towards transforming CCI (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nepal, South Africa);
  - Institutions are factored into political/peace agreement implementation, including at sub-national levels (Colombia, Nepal, Yemen, Zimbabwe); and,
  - There is engagement and integration (where appropriate) of informal and customary systems and institutions into peace and development processes (Bosnia and Herzegovina, South Sudan, Yemen, Zimbabwe); and
- Activating resilience capacities, i.e.: active, engaged citizens (South Africa, Zimbabwe,) and fostering a culture of dialogue (Cyprus, Nepal, Yemen), strong sense of national identity (South Sudan, Zimbabwe).

**TUNISIA:** From addressing core sources of conflict to building inclusive institutions and fostering social cohesion, Tunisia's State and citizens are evolving their social contract. They are doing this through a series of social-contract making mechanisms to move the goals of the revolution forward, amid efforts to rehabilitate the State. This means building bridges and mending fences, vertically and horizontally, and shielding the country from new and enduring challenges. However, as long as economic and governance challenges are not fully addressed, the resilience of these social contracts will be tested. Resilience capacities as a cross-cutting issue (across the drivers) is vital for understanding what works (i.e. how Tunisians have withstood violence) and lies at the core of understanding Tunisia's ability to forge a resilient social contract and sustain peace from the bottom up. As a result of its openness to diversity due to its history, Tunisia has a particular resilience capacity for restoring its social cohesion when it is under duress. It does this by drawing on its culture of adaptation, negotiation and compromise. Another resilience capacity links to its efforts and achievements towards gender equality. The presence of women at the ministerial level, as parliamentary representatives and as heads of transition commissions, bolsters Tunisia's inclusive governance and prospects for sustaining peace. Without further political, economic and social reforms, such gains may, however, not reach their full potential.

**CYPRUS:** The inability to make progress on all three drivers of the social contract and the negative impacts and interactions that are ensuing, creates a vicious cycle of failure across the three drivers. The failure of the political process (driver 1) and institutional discrimination (driver 2, a result of the failure of driver 1) has resulted in a failure to deliver services to all communities, and worsened horizontal (inter-group) cohesion. Not attending to

social cohesion makes the core conflict issues all the more difficult to resolve. This is evidenced in quantitative studies that show a direct association between inter-group prejudice and insisting on national security guarantees following a settlement – a demand that is unlikely to permit attainment of common ground between the two communities. The case of Cyprus confirms the importance of attending to all three drivers of the social contract in efforts to prevent conflict and sustain peace, notably by broadening and deepening the political process, by fostering more inclusiveness in institutions, and by building trust as follows: i) between citizens of the two communities; ii) between citizens of each community and the institutions of the other community; and, iii) between all citizen groups and the political process that is meant to lead to the forging of a national social contract for Cyprus. Societal capacities for resilience can be better engaged for peace, notably society's aversion to use of political violence, and a willingness to engage in political dialogue and understand the perspectives of the other community.

**ZIMBABWE:** The ending of the 2009 power sharing agreement in 2013 which reinstated ZANU-PF's one party rule, and with it the end of political will to implement the GPA and 2013 Constitutional provisions presents a key impediment to Zimbabwe's peaceful transition. Reinforcing these findings, Zimbabweans across the political divide following the 2017 coup are calling for renewed power-sharing, but ZANU-PF so far is determined to maintain a one-party rule after President Mugabe's forced resignation. The GPA and the 2013 Constitution, reflecting strong societal buy-in across parties, still provide a basis for moving forward. Balancing political power between contesting parties, and connecting these agreements to institutional reform (driver 2) and transparent, practical policies and accountability mechanisms to ensure implementation, will build trust vertically and horizontally. This will strengthen social cohesion (driver 3), which in turn will undermine the ability of elites to fuel polarisation and develop informal agreements (driver 1). It will also generate demands for better governance. The main fault lines in Zimbabwe are political. While these fault lines must be addressed politically, the primary focus on political reform, managed by elites, simply has not worked. Zimbabwean resilience capacities include a strong sense of national identity and strong civic culture, a highly educated population and a culture of socio-economic resilience (in spite of the economic decline), as evidenced by the pervasive informal sector. These capacities need to be better engaged to catalyse virtuous movement towards a resilient social contract.

**YEMEN:** For social contract-making to achieve sustainable results towards lasting peace, stronger engagement between the State and society is required at sub-national level, and among various groups. This will also support a more transparent, functional and inclusive political settlement. Yemen's culture of dialogue is a resilience capacity for peace that will support this engagement. The strengthening of vertical and horizontal societal cohesion over time and through institutions should be a foundational objective. Restoration of basic services is vital for solidifying trust and co-operation among and between group members, and groups and the State. Building on customary mechanisms, Yemenis need to better engage their primary resilience capacity – as a consensus based society, with a strong tradition of consultation – if they are to achieve and sustain a broad-based, societally owned peace. Capitalising on Yemen's private sector, including small businesses, and strong civil society which has mobilised massively during the conflict as a counter weight to tribalism, will be key.

**BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA** is a State commonly viewed as always about to collapse, yet it does not. Challenges to a resilient social contract include: legalised ethnic and spatial divisions that support a nationalist hegemonic order; one of the most cumbersome administrative apparatuses per capita in the world, with overlapping governance structures that foster opportunities for ethnic outbidding; policy paralysis; informal networks and corruption; and, soaring levels of unemployment, the highest in Europe. The elite social contract remains decisive in constraining the boundaries within which an everyday social contract, more amenable to civic notions of citizenship, can take root. A revision of the constitution to support the emergence of civic identity (notably consociational elements which should enable co-operation across ethnic divides) and to simplify the governance system, could contribute substantially to move the country beyond a condition of

negative peace. Bosnia and Herzegovina's resilience capacities for peace, including the large diaspora (see D3.2), and civic groups and informal networks, can support the growth of civic consciousness and wider forms of co-existence and cooperation, particularly around the economy. They should be nurtured.

**NEPAL:** A truly resilient social contract in Nepal is for now elusive. Continued progress is needed to address the core conflict issues, to build a more capable and effective state, and to build peace among Nepalis at the local level, in particular, to reaffirm a common national identity and sense of collective destiny. Nepalis have valuable resilience capacities that need continued engagement, including the ability to pursue dialogue to bridge differences. Amending the 2015 Constitution is also needed to meet the aspirations of different ethnic and marginalised communities. If achieved, this can serve as a foundation for a new social contract for lasting peace and reconciliation.

**COLOMBIA:** Whether Colombia's peace agreement is providing space to reshape existing political power dynamics, yet is conditional on processes of institutional and social consolidation that exceed what the agreement can achieve on its own. Two (related) factors are essential for building an inclusive social contract. The first involves strengthening state institutions at the national and sub-national levels to facilitate service delivery. This involves addressing deep-seated inequalities in relation to land, lifting more of the population out of poverty, and designing effective instruments to enable the State to fulfil its developmental functions – processes that started before the peace agreement and will last long after its implementation. Second, trust must be built among Colombian communities to promote reconciliation that lays a foundation for a common vision for society. Resilience capacities need to be engaged and leveraged to support the inclusiveness and resilience of Colombia's social contract. These include Colombia's vibrant civil society, state-sponsored "institutional scaffolding for peace," and legal framework for responding to humanitarian crises (i.e. forcibly displaced populations). Reintegrating former combatants, reparation processes for victims, the development of transitional justice mechanisms and historical memory mechanisms also need ongoing support.

**SOUTH AFRICA:** Active citizenship – a primary resilience capacity of South Africans – assisted by the integrity of the courts and the rights enshrined in the Constitution, has introduced a vibrancy into South Africa's social contract. Drawing on a long history of social action, and a vision of a more equal and decolonised society, the confrontations between citizens and the State hold the prospect for a more durable social contract grounded in lived experience and ongoing transformation. Particularly at the micro-level, this activist culture has forced the South African State into greater responsiveness – required for a resilient social contract that can sustain South Africa's hard-won peace. This engagement between civil society, informal community movements, and government has created space for democracy and development to be shaped by communities, even if in ways that are conflictual. These serve to challenge the state infrastructure to create and effectively implement policies that take into account the legitimate needs of citizens, framed in terms of dignity rather than in terms of minimum access to services and employment. These processes are also serving to place positive checks on state misconduct and forged a more responsive state – vital for stronger state-society relations. Additional resilience capacities, including a constitution-affirming judiciary, watchdog media, and a state-led broad safety-net of social grants, are supporting this transformation.

## Working Group of Case Study Authors and Advisers<sup>46</sup>

### Case Study Authors

- **Afghanistan:** Dr. Orzala Ashraf Nemat, School of Oriental and African Studies; Susanne Schmeidl, University of New South Wales, Australia
- **Bosnia-Herzegovina:** Jasmin Ramovic, University of Manchester; Roberto Belloni, University of Trento
- **Colombia:** Angelika Rettberg, Universidad de los Andes
- **Cyprus:** Alexandros Lordos, Center for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD)\*
- **Nepal:** Subindra Bogati, Nepali Peacebuilding Initiative; Timothy D. Sisk (see below)
- **Sierra Leone:** David Francis, University of Bradford
- **Somalia:** Deqa Hagi Yusuf, IIDA Women's Development Organisation
- **South Sudan:** Luka Biong Deng, University of Juba
- **South Africa:** Hugo van der Merwe and Masana Ndinga, Centre for Study of Violence and Reconciliation
- **Tunisia:** Youssef Mahmoud and Andrea Ó Súilleabháin, International Peace Institute
- **Yemen:** Fatima Abo Al Asrar, Basement Foundation
- **Zimbabwe:** Showers Mawowa, Southern African Liaison Office; Erin McCandless (see below)

### Scholar and Policy Advisers

- Alina Rocha Menocal, Overseas Development Institute, United Kingdom\*
- Marie-Joelle Zahar, University of Montreal, Canada\*
- Mary Hope Schwoebel, Nova Southeastern University
- Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, The Graduate Institute Geneva, Switzerland.
- Seth Kaplan, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), US
- Timothy D. Sisk, Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver, US
- Neven Knezevik, United Nations Children's Fund, Kenya.
- Habib Ur Rehman Mayar, g7+ Group of Countries Secretariat, Timor-Leste.
- Henk-Jan Brinkman, United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office, US
- Sarah Lister, Oslo Governance Centre, UNDP, Norway.

**Research and Project Director: Dr. Erin McCandless** is an academic and policy adviser with over two decades of experience working on and in conflict affected settings, on issues of peacebuilding, statebuilding, governance, development and resilience, as well as their intersections. She is a part-time faculty member at The New School's Graduate Program in International Affairs in New York, an Honorary Senior Lecturer at the University of Kwazulu Natal in South Africa, and Founder and Co-Executive Editor of the international, refereed *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development*. She also serves as a civil society Co-Chair of the New Deal Implementation Working Group of International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. Dr. McCandless consults widely across the UN system and with other international organizations, conducting research and evaluation, and facilitating strategic processes and trainings. She is author of more than fifty publications, including three books and several policy and program-shifting UN reports. More information can be found on her website: [www.erinmccandless.net](http://www.erinmccandless.net)

### Project Support

*Senior Researcher: Rebecca Hollender, The New School*

*Digital Strategies Specialist: Gabrielle Belli*

<sup>46</sup> While all working group members are active in the design and review of this research, those with an asterisk (\*) are methods team members, who are playing an elevated role in advising on research design and related review of case studies and synthesis findings.





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### Report written by Research and Project Director, Erin McCandless

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