Peacemaking as a Struggle Over the Social Contract:
Challenges and Opportunities of the New Peace Agreement in Colombia

Angelika Rettberg
Universidad de los Andes
Bogotá – Colombia
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

After more than 50 years of conflict, the Colombian Government and the leftist group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) signed a peace agreement in November 2016. The agreement—and the negotiations leading up to the final document—created an opportunity for addressing historical inequalities in the Colombian political system and its socio-economic structures. However, Colombian society remains deeply divided, as is common during processes of political settlement. Some of the aspirations of the peace agreement may be too ambitious and generate expectations that exceed the capacities of existing state institutions. In addition, opposition by political and social actors has been significant. At the same time, Colombia has made more progress on the state- and peace-building front than many other countries with a similar conflict background. This paper argues that the unfinished business of building a comprehensive, inclusive and ultimately resilient social contract in Colombia explains many of these tensions, which are examined through the lens of three postulated ‘drivers’ of a social contract, and how two ‘core conflict issues’ are addressed: the distribution and use of land, and illicit crops and the drug trade.

1. Introduction

After more than 50 years of conflict, the Colombian Government and the leftist group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) signed a peace agreement in November 2016. Since 2017, negotiations with the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), a smaller remaining guerrilla group, have been underway. The peace agreement—and the negotiations leading up to the final document—created an opening for addressing historical inequalities in Colombian society, such as the structure of land ownership and use. It also facilitated FARC’s conversion into a political party and provided for transitional justice measures, including lenient sentences in exchange for truth and victims’ reparations.

Many in Colombian society questioned whether any of these concessions should be granted to what is widely believed to be a terrorist group considered militarily defeated and trapped in the drug trade. The debate deepened after a referendum gave opponents to the agreement a razor-thin majority (which was later superseded by Congress’s adoption of an adjusted agreement). Illustrating the conflicting views over the merits of the agreement, then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon referred to Colombia as a “bright flare of hope” (UN 2016) and President Santos (2010 – 2014; 2014 – 2018) was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his achievement. This captured a widespread feeling of satisfaction by a success-hungry international community, which, however, contrasts with domestic indifference or dislike.

This case study and overarching 11-country research and policy dialogue project are informed by a conceptual framing and methodology1 that investigates what drives a resilient national social contract—that is, a dynamic national agreement between state and society, including different groups in society, on how to live together. As discussed in the study framing (Box A), peace agreements are only part of a process of political settlement that is messy and complex and takes time. This is true in Colombia. As argued in this paper, the discussion over the Colombian peace agreement reveals the unfinished business of building a comprehensive, inclusive and ultimately resilient social contract in Colombia.

Despite progress on the peace process, such a contract does not exist in Colombia. As illustrated in this paper, in the course of its history, the country has witnessed contestation at every level of the system, from the national to the subnational, and across different sectors of society, often in violent

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1. This research was overseen, and this working paper edited, by Research and Project Director, Erin McCandless. For full project framing, see McCandless, Erin. 2018. “Reconceptualizing the Social Contract in Contexts of Conflict, Fragility and Fraught Transition”. Working Paper, Witwatersrand University. https://www.wits.ac.za/wsg/research/research-publications-/working-papers/
terms. The contestation cannot be limited to one dominant and one subordinate order, as all groups have had institutional resources and tools, some of a formal, many of an informal nature. In contrast with previous periods in national history, more of this contestation today takes place within formal institutions reflecting the Colombian state’s growing capacity to perform core developmental functions, including health, education and infrastructure (despite -- or because of -- being engaged in a decade-long conflict). However, progress has been uneven, depending on sector of society and region of the country. A profound schism still divides urban from rural Colombia. In addition, formal and informal institutions interact, sometimes reinforcing, but often undermining and competing with each other. As a result, despite the formal end to the country’s decade-long armed conflict, the emergence of a resilient and inclusive social contract will be a lengthy and tumultuous process.

The debate over the peace agreement in Colombia reflects many of these struggles among institutionally anchored views of society. This paper assesses the value of three proposed ‘drivers’ of a resilient social contract, as laid out in the overall project framing (Box A). It examines these through the lens of two core conflict issues, which have been at the centre of the armed conflict’s ignition, transformation and duration: 1) the structure of land ownership and use and 2) illicit crops, which have contributed to the Colombian armed conflict’s long duration and transformation over time by providing income and access to global economic networks to illegal armed actors and weakening state institutions. Both issues were addressed in the peace settlement and lend themselves well for analysing the tensions resulting from the unfinished, fragmented and precarious social contract in Colombia.

To prepare this article, existing academic literature was reviewed. Official reports and policy documents were also reviewed, in addition to the data available in the larger project’s Data Resources document. Opinion polls and surveys provided relevant background. Focus groups and interviews in the capital, Bogotá, and in two Colombian regions -- Valle and Antioquia -- provided additional insights from the perspective of local authorities, civil society leaders, the private sector and academia.

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2. For full project framing, see McCandless 2018.
This case study and overarching 11-country research and policy dialogue project are informed by a conceptual framing and methodology that investigates what drives a resilient national social contract – that is, a dynamic national agreement between state and society, including different groups in society, on how to live together. Such a contract includes the distribution and exercise of power, and how different demands, conflict interests and expectations around rights and responsibilities are mediated over time through different spheres and mechanisms. Three postulated ‘drivers’ of such a contract, constructed through deeply rooted in evidence-based research and dialogue within the project working group, are that:

1. Political settlements and social contract-making mechanisms are increasingly inclusive and responsive to ‘core conflict issues’.
2. Institutions (formal, customary and informal) are increasingly effective and inclusive and have broadly shared outcomes that meet societal expectations and enhance state legitimacy.
3. Social cohesion is broadening and deepening, with formal and informal ties and interactions binding society horizontally (across citizens, between groups) and vertically (between citizens/groups and the state).

The value of these proposed drivers and their interactions is assessed in these studies for their ability to better understand what went wrong and the prospects for attaining and sustaining peace in Colombia.

Social contract-making’ spheres and related institutional mechanisms – central to the study framing and findings – are conceptualised as follows: Peacemaking (i.e., through a peace agreement or political agreement); Transitional (i.e., sequenced dialogues, commissions, truth and reconciliation processes); Governance-related, including formal mechanisms (i.e., codified structures of government, formal institutions, national development plans, devolution frameworks/policies) and hybrid mechanisms (i.e., where religious/customary/non-state actor and state mechanisms interact); and Everyday (i.e., citizen actions or practices, norms, mores). In this study, the everyday sphere also serves as a litmus test of the extent to which higher-level, formalised agreements or processes represent wider societal views.

3. As defined in this study, these are overt drivers of conflict and discord, either historical, or contemporary in nature, broadly agreed by the main parties to drive conflict and discord, that are being disputed in the policy arena nationally, over time, and have resonance for most, if not all of the population. Ideally, they are reflected in formal agreements or mechanisms and enable examination of how state and society address conflict (McCandless 2018).
2.0 Context

2.1 Brief description of armed conflict and past political settlements

The Colombian armed conflict was long considered a protracted one, because of its lengthy duration, the resilience to negotiated solutions and the difficult issues at stake, such as the unequal and unproductive structure of land ownership and the growing involvement in the highly lucrative drug trade by all illegal actors. Over 20 efforts were made to bring the conflict with as many as seven guerrilla groups to a halt (Bejarano 1995; Chernick 1999; Pizarro 1990; Villarraga 2015). Some of these efforts at the end of the 1980s were successful, leading to the demobilisation of more than three groups and their participation in the drafting of a new constitution in 1991. Others failed because of lack of political will, strong spoilers (within the military and recalcitrant rural elites) and the growing lure of the drug trade.

Part of Colombia’s violence has historical roots. National independence from Spain did not aim for the equality of subordinate groups like indigenous people, blacks or mestizos and sowed the seeds of the profoundly centralised administrative system, in which the capital—despite many decentralisation efforts—concentrates budgets and decision-making power. As a result, the construction of national identity has been a highly contested process (Dennis 2006; Wade 2001), marked by competition among national and regional levels and among socially diverse groups. Civil wars—confronting parties, secularists and non-clericalists, and federalists and centralists—characterized the 19th and large part of the 20th centuries (González 2014; Palacios 2002).

For many, the armed conflict of the leftist guerrillas, which began in the 1960s, against the Colombian state was a continuation of some of these historical struggles. The spread of communism in Latin America under the auspices of the Cuban Revolution (Chernick 1999; Vargas 2000; Pizarro 1990) and the mobilisation of landless peasants against the state led to the formation of the main rebel groups: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP), which demanded agrarian reform, and the National Liberation Army (ELN), which pressed for the nationalisation of natural resources. Other groups, such as the M-19, demanded an opening of the political system and the dismantling of the National Front, a consociational agreement designed in the 1950s to stem interparty violence.

In 1991, amidst a peak of drug- and conflict-related violence, a new constitution was drafted to acknowledge and integrate ethnic, cultural and regional diversity and produce a more inclusive social contract. It also elevated ‘peace’ to a fundamental constitutional right, thereby stating the expectation that new norms would provide a needed antidote to massive violence. The Constitution was developed by a National Assembly composed of representatives of several demobilised guerrilla groups, as well as a diverse range of social and political sectors. With the new Constitution, indigenous people and Afro-descendants achieved territorial rights, while religious and social minorities achieved political and cultural rights (Castillo 2006). A whole chapter on citizen participation sough to increase the frequency and flexibility of opportunities for citizens to participate in social, political and civic life. A norm to provide immediate protection of fundamental rights (in Spanish, “acción de tutela”; in English, “guardianship action”) established a direct channel between individuals and the judicial system and has been described by experts as a milestone for overcoming the gap between citizens, especially the most vulnerable ones, and the state (Rodríguez and Rodríguez 2010). As a result, the 1991 Constitution was considered not only the backbone of a new peace pact for the country, but also very progressive in comparison to former Colombian and other Latin American constitutions (García 2012). However, the Constitution also challenged privileges and worldviews of other sectors, as reflected in the ongoing struggles of women, secular and LGBTI communities to gain equality in access to education, health and other social services. In addition, while it exerted pressure to increase access to social services, it also fiscally strained the Colombian state (Londoño 2001). In part, opposition to the
2016 peace agreement—leading to its defeat in the referendum—has been attributed to a socially and economically conservative as well as religious backlash to the 1991 Constitution’s liberal aspirations.

Despite the Constitution’s intentions, the Colombian conflict escalated rapidly in the 1990s as a result of the guerrillas’ immersion into the drug trade, which complemented their traditional sources of funding—kidnappings and extortion—and boosted their ability to recruit fighters and gain military capacity (Pécaut 1997; Nieto 2001; Nasi and Rettberg 2016). In addition, right-wing paramilitaries—linked to landed interests, counterinsurgent efforts and the drug trade—fought against the guerrillas for territorial control. As a result, the end of the 1990s and early 2000s saw the greatest peaks in humanitarian emergencies in the country. In total, 200,000 people died while over eight million were victims of forced displacement, kidnappings, forced disappearance and recruitment, and sexual violence.

The tide changed in the early 2000s, when a US-funded aid package aimed at curbing the drug trade (Rosen 2014; Tickner 2003) substantially improved the offensive capacity of the Colombian military forces (Isaacson 2010), delivering unprecedented blows against FARC and improving security and economic indicators across the country. This helped the Colombian state to produce the conditions for credible talks with the largest remaining group (FARC) (Nasi and Rettberg, forthcoming), which President Juan Manuel Santos launched in Cuba in 2012. The agreement reached in 2016 set out to address rural reform, illicit crops, political participation of minority groups, and transitional justice. In addition to producing the demobilisation of the fighters, the agreement was guided by an interest in strengthening inclusion-promoting institutions and social relations as well as the supply of resources to heretofore underprivileged regions of the country.

However, in a referendum on the peace agreement in October 2016, abstention was higher than 60 percent. In addition, a small majority of 50.21 percent voted ‘no’ (against 49.78 percent who voted ‘yes’, with a difference of less than 55,000 votes, or less than 1 percent of eligible voters). In light of this result, the government and FARC developed and signed a new agreement, bypassing the referendum result. The process made visible profound political divisions in relation to aspects such as amnesty for lay fighters, non-punitive sentences for commanders, and the possibility of holding the armed forces and third parties such as the private sector accountable for their participation in human rights violations.

The fact that an agreement was finally reached suggests that a window of opportunity has emerged for a more inclusive social contract and that there is some institutionally embedded social support for transformation. However, conflict issues are linked to deeply entrenched formal and informal institutions that partially explain profound polarisation and widespread contestation. The following sections illustrate this assertion in the case of two core conflict issues: land structure, ownership and use; and illicit crops and the drug trade.

### 2.2 Core conflict issue #1 – land

Land in Colombia has been historically underutilized, concentrated in the hands of a few and embedded in rigid and inefficient institutions. As a result, the ‘agrarian problem’ has consistently been singled out as a core conflict issue in Colombia (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2013; Reyes 2016; Sánchez 2017). Colombia has one of the highest concentrations of land in Latin America: as documented by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), “82 percent of the country’s productive land is in the hands of only 10 percent of the total owners, while 68 percent of the farms have less than 5 hectares, and only 50 percent of the land is formalized” (FAO 2017). In addition, large extensions of land are highly unproductive, and rural living, health and education conditions are systematically and historically inferior to urban conditions (Ibáñez, Gáfaro and Zarruk 2012). Further, the rural tax system privileges land owners and does not provide income to support the tasks that the
Colombian state should perform across the whole territory.

The origins of Colombia’s rural problem are historical. During the 19th century, the fledgling Colombian state inherited and continued to promulgate the colonial practice of handing over land for military or other services or to promote land occupation (Vélez 2012). By the end of the 19th century, this practice was complemented by granting property rights to settlers (colonos) who were cultivating untitled wastelands. The 1936 Land Law (Law 200) formalised this land-grabbing model, fostering concentration of ownership and inequality, protecting low taxes for land owners and breeding rural violence (Zuluaga 2011). While inequality has historical roots, it is also an ongoing process, as the concentration of rural property has increased since 2000 (Ibañez and Muñoz 2010; and Gáfaro, Ibañez and Zarruk 2014). Reform has been difficult because institutions responsible for rural development programmes have been “traditionally weak and captured by private interests” (Gáfaro, Ibañez and Zarruk 2014; see also Reyes 2016).

The link between land and armed conflict is very strong. Agrarian reform played a pivotal role in FARC’s founding as a group representing peasant interests and demanding agrarian reform. In addition, land seizures and the forced displacement of over seven million rural inhabitants from the land they lived on are some of the most relevant traits of the Colombian armed conflict, which were promoted by rightist paramilitary counterinsurgent forces since the 1980s. Much of the abandoned land has not been properly titled, facilitating its take-over by new—formal and informal—owners. In 2011, Law 1448 addressed the needs of victims in terms of land restitution. However, the process has been slow, owing to the slow pace and institutional constraints for social reform. In addition, many victims’ leaders demanding the formalisation of their land rights have been persecuted and killed (Arias et al. 2017).

2.3 Core conflict issue #2 – illicit crops and the drug trade

Colombia has been plagued by drug trade-related violence since the 1970s. The pervasive effects of drugs on politics, society and the economy have been well documented and include corruption, institutional atrophy and a generalised perception of state incapacity (Tickner, García and Arreaza 2011; Gaviria and Mejía 2011). More than 90 percent of cocaine seizures in the US originate from Colombia (DEA 2017b). While the area that has been planted with illicit crops represents less than 1 percent of Colombian territory (UNODC 2017:23), the value of Colombian coca production amounts to up to 1.2 percent of the Colombian GDP, although, in hot spots of coca production such as the region of Guaviare, production and transformation can amount to up to 12 percent of GDP. Over 70 percent of coca-related income is produced at the level of distribution, benefiting transnational crime networks (Insight Crime 2017); coca peasants themselves are rarely lifted out of poverty (UNODC 2017; La República 2017). In addition to the drug cartels, Colombian insurgents and paramilitary groups became deeply involved in the drug trade since the 1980s. Crop-producing areas as well as the strategic corridors and ports have been under control mainly of FARC, followed by several smaller criminal organisations, all of them tied to international networks (Echandía 2001; Rocha 2011; Vargas 2014). This has deeply discredited guerrilla groups and their structural reform agenda, especially FARC, who have been labelled “narcoterrorists” by international and domestic critics.

According to the Center for Historical Memory (2013), the drug trade has had at least four effects on armed conflict: 1) it funded the illegal groups and their social support basis, thus facilitating massive recruitment in the 1990s; 2) it broadened the rural inequality gap by aiding drug traffickers in the acquisition of land. As drug lords bought land, they became targets of guerrilla pressure and created paramilitary groups to provide counterinsurgent pressure (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2013); this, in turn, resulted in 3) the forced displacement of peasant populations; and 4) drug-related corruption and violence weakened the Colombian state and, eventually, the guerrillas, as the prospects of drug-related income introduced divisions into their organisation and subverted their...
political aspirations. Bottom line: While the drug trade produces significant wealth, little of this benefits producers and most causes growing inequality and violence in crop-growing areas.

The fight against illicit crops and their effect on Colombian society and economy have a major international component, as US military and intelligence cooperation have been crucial in monitoring crops and promoting policy ranging from forceful eradication to controlling the inflow of drug-related money into the formal economy. Due to the systemic and global nature of the drug economy, unilateral efforts on the supply side have not been able to affect global demand for illegal drugs nor local incentives for cultivating. In fact, in recent years, crops have expanded (UNODC 2016a). When the state has promoted eradication campaigns, these have seldom been accompanied by parallel efforts to boost legal economic development (Ramírez 2001). As a result, the relationship between the state and coca-growing peasants (who are poor and disenfranchised) is mostly antagonistic, as the state has not only been absent but, when it arrives, acts in a repressive manner.

2.4 Resilience for peace capacities

Although Colombia still ranks low on most ‘peace’ rankings (Data Resources, 2016), it possesses resilience for peace capacities consisting of institutional and social assets that will prove crucial in light of the challenges related to building a resilient social contract.4

On the one hand, since the 1990s, the country has developed a significant state-sponsored or internationally backed institutional scaffolding for peace (Rettberg 2012) or peacebuilding infrastructure (Ryan 2012). Over the past 20 years, the state has developed legal frameworks to address humanitarian crises, aiding the social reintegration of former combatants, promoting the reparation of victims, developing transitional justice mechanisms and promoting historical memory (Rettberg 2012). Some of these frameworks—such as the Constitutional Court-mandated system to respond to the needs of the forcibly displaced population (defined in the 1990s; Rodríguez and Rodríguez 2010) or the executive agency in charge of reintegrating former combatants (put in place in 2003)—have gained international acknowledgment. This has been complemented with an ambitious development and peacebuilding agenda supported by international cooperation actors (Bergamaschi, García and Santacruz 2017) since the 1980s. These capacities are important in that they provide a counterweight to the weaknesses in institutional performance mentioned in the description of the core conflict issues and show that Colombia is a country of enormous strengths as well as of challenges.

These resilience-for-peace capacities at the state level are complemented with vibrant and strong civil society organisations and initiatives (Rettberg 2017; Kaplan 2017). As documented by a recent study of close to 2,000 civil society peace initiatives, topics such as the building of local capacities, the development of a pro-democratic culture and the promotion of victims’ rights have been endorsed and encouraged by civil society organisations across the country at least since the 1980s (Rettberg 2017). In this sense, one of the few positive impacts of war “was civil society”.5 Although civil society leaders have often been targets of violent backlashes by all armed groups, both aspects reveal “endogenous capacities to address shocks and stressors”6 that will be a critical source of resilience in coming years.

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4. As defined in this overarching study, these are endogenous capacities to address shocks and stressors (including drivers of conflict and fragility) in ways that minimally (adaptively) mitigate the effects of conflict and more maximally (transformatively) uproot these drivers and foster new or revitalized structures and systems that support peace (guidance document).

5. In Spanish: “El capital que dejó la guerra fue la sociedad civil”. Interview with Lucía González, cultural leader from Antioquia, 2 July 2017, Bogotá.

3.0 DRIVER 1 – Political Settlements Addressing Core Conflict Issues

The 2016 Colombian peace agreement accurately set out to address the main, historical impediments for sustainable peace in the country, including the core conflict issues of land and illicit crops. The very fact that an agreement was reached suggests that a window of opportunity has emerged for a more inclusive social contract. In addition to the agreement itself, a significant architecture was designed to roll out the peace deal. This section examines Colombia’s attempt to address the core conflict issues—land and illicit crops—through the peace agreement and related transitional mechanisms, the first proposed driver of a resilient social contract. In addition, the section discusses how this matters in everyday activities.

While negotiations were still ongoing, the Colombian Government created a Post-conflict Ministry (later adjusted to a High Council for Post-conflict) to oversee implementation and to coordinate domestic and international fund-raising to tend to the multiple needs arising from the demobilisation of thousands of fighters and the development of a vast institutional structure to coordinate multiple peacebuilding efforts across levels of the state and the regions of the country. A transitional monitoring commission (in Spanish, the Comisión de Seguimiento, Impulso y Verificación a la Implementación del Acuerdo Final- CSIVI)—with the participation of FARC and the national government—was designed to oversee specific aspects of the implementation of the peace agreement. The monitoring mechanism thrived on trust-building efforts developed during formal negotiations in Havana and serves as a fundamental sounding board for the status of implementation. Furthermore, a state agency for the renovation of the territory (Agencia para la Renovación del Territorio – ART) was created, which is in charge of developing regionally specific development plans—including projects related to land productivity—for 170 municipalities that are considered priorities for state action due to high levels of rural poverty, presence of land mines, presence of demobilized guerrilla camps, and illicit crops. Perhaps more significantly, the ART will manage the Land Fund, described below.

The peace agreement also provided for a sophisticated transitional justice structure to address human rights violations committed by all sides (including the guerrillas, the armed forces and third parties), to compensate the more than eight million victims in the country who have formally registered with the Colombian state, and to promote national reconciliation. This includes amnesties for minor crimes, a Truth Commission and a Special Peace Jurisdiction (staffed by 51 judges with a mandate for 10 years, renewable to a total of 15 years) to oversee the handing out of sentences for selected crimes. Crimes and human rights violations related to land play a central role in the aspirations of the Colombian transitional justice structure, mainly because most of the victims of forced displacement are landless peasants (see context section). This structure builds on and strengthens institutional developments prior to the agreement, discussed in the section above.

Putting the new transitional justice structure into place profoundly challenges formal institutions and popular preferences. This became especially clear in the referendum that was called by the government for the Colombian population to dis/approve the peace deal. However, instead of providing the agreement with a strong popular backing, the referendum ended up giving a slight victory to the ‘no’ vote. Although the deal was re-negotiated and a new version approved by Congress, the referendum results suggest that the disapproval of lenient sentences for grave human rights violations, political participation by groups related to the drug trade, and the fear of rural reform loomed large over society’s opinions. This was also reflected in public opinion surveys and social networks (LAPOP 2017), which showed increased polarisation among several sectors of society. Given the proximity of elections in 2018, this raised the political cost of defending the peace agreement and fed into the slimming of government-friendly congressional majorities (Rettberg and Quiroga 2018) needed to pass legislation for agreement-related (including rural) reforms.
The contrast between the ambitions of the agreement drafters and the political and social preferences of large portions of society, who are either indifferent or reject full-fledged inclusion, is notorious in contemporary Colombia. A focus on how core conflict issues were addressed in these spheres and mechanisms and on what obstacles they face makes this especially clear.

3.1 Core conflict issue #1 – land

The peace agreement with FARC included a chapter on rural reform, stipulating efforts to formalise land tenure, modernise the rural tax system, boost land use and productivity with increased access to credits and technical advice, increase investment with incentives geared at the private sector to move operations to remote rural areas, and promote inclusion of vulnerable social groups, such as dispossessed peasants, victims of the armed conflict, and rural women. Government negotiators made a point of underscoring that including land and measures for increasing rural productivity in the agreement was not only a concession to FARC. Sergio Jaramillo, the government’s High Commissioner for Peace, publicly stated, “We are not addressing these topics because of FARC, but for Colombians. [...] We are convinced that these reforms are needed so that peace can take root and Colombia can have a future different from violence” (cited in Reyes 2016, p. 4). This illustrated that, for many Colombians, the system of land tenure and use had turned into a liability for economic progress and that the agreement was an opportunity to go beyond FARC demobilisation and address core conflict issues as well as issues concerning future development.

The agreement proposed a state-managed Land Fund, which is expected to purchase three million hectares and invest in the formalisation of tenure of seven million hectares (Semana 2016). The required infrastructure (roads, ports, and electricity, sewage and internet facilities) to connect far-off-centre regions and attract private investors (Miklian and Rettberg 2017) is still pending approval by Congress, but, once in place, is expected to produce a fundamental revamping of the Colombian countryside.

While the Land Fund is geared towards vulnerable groups, FARC pursued the development of a cooperative of former FARC members (ECOMUN) in the areas that used to be under its de facto control. Based on a collective fund, ECOMUN seeks to develop agrarian projects to support former fighters as well as surrounding communities, expanding the benefits of FARC demobilisation from increased security to greater inclusion of formerly disenfranchised groups.

However, the design of the Land Fund is contentious, especially the extent to which it will include ‘unlawfully’ held land (i.e., informal tenure) in addition to state-owned land. Fears of traditional and recent landowners that there might be a large Venezuela-style expropriation effort loom large. “It was never about FARC (alone), it was always about the status quo,” as former chief negotiator Humberto de la Calle described the opposition to the agreement.7 Similarly, an official of a regional business association said, “There were real concerns about the rural reform and about expropriations. It will not work that easily.”8

At the same time, opposition to the agreement—both in terms of design and in terms of the ongoing implementation—did not simply plot private sector (or oligarchical) against worker (or peasant) interests: many companies in the construction, industry, trade, transportation and service sectors expressed interest in exploring investment opportunities linked to the ‘territorial peace’ project or have already engaged in such efforts over the years. Over 400 new enterprises have been founded in some of the hardest-hit areas of conflict since 2017 alone (Presidencia 2018). Therefore, contestation over the agreement cannot be read in classical class-struggle terms, but needs to take into account

8. Member, Proantioquia, interview by author, Medellín, 4 August 2017.
intra-sectoral divisions along the lines of links to formal and international markets and international competitiveness as opposed to those more inward-looking, informal types of economic activity.

3.2 Core conflict issue #2 – illicit crops and the drug trade

The agreement reached with FARC on illicit crops is closely linked to issues of rural reform. One-hundred-thousand hectares of illicit crops are expected to be destroyed voluntarily or forcefully and up to 10 million Colombians are expected to benefit. In return, the Colombian state has committed to improving crop substitution programmes, aiming to provide communities with legal economic alternatives and credit, thus “depriving the armed conflict from its most important fuel”, in the words of chief negotiator Humberto de la Calle (Semana 2014). The institutional mechanism whereby this purpose is being addressed is the National Integral Programme for the Substitution of Illicit Crops (Programa Nacional Integral de Sustitución de Cultivos de Uso Ilícito – PNIS), which was included in the peace agreement in a chapter specifically dedicated to illicit crops. In order to boost compliance by communities, substitution activities and municipal plans are developed and monitored by a body composed of central and local government and FARC representatives. Substitution agreements are signed by all parties, including representatives of local communities. The PNIS promotes inclusion and seeks to avoid the creation of new local grievances in that it strives to benefit not only illicit-crop-cultivating peasants, but also surrounding communities, who need investment and development as well.

A key challenge in this process has been the deterrence of non-coca-producing communities from pursuing illicit crops. In order to track the development of illicit crops and eradication efforts, the Colombian Government has benefited from satellite images provided by the UN Office for Drug and Crime (UNODC) since 1999. These images have suggested a steady drop in crops over the past years, but an increase since 2015 (UNODC 2016a). The increase is attributable to efforts of remaining illegal groups to occupy territories abandoned by FARC and to promote illicit crops; it is also attributable to an apparently perverse incentive in the agreement, as FARC promoted illicit crops in areas under their control so peasants could qualify for the benefits allotted to voluntary eradication efforts in the agreement (DEA 2017). In addition, there is increasing evidence that Mexican cartels are now operating in Colombia to stimulate production, integrating new communities into the coca chain.

The transition to a model privileging the structural conditions on the supply side more than interdiction on the demand side has been historically challenging, especially in the context of new criminal organisations seeking to enter the market. On the one hand, as mentioned above, illicit crops and the drug trade escape Colombia’s ability to tackle the issue alone. The US, Colombia’s main partner in addressing the drug issue, has supported crop-substitution programmes, but favours interdiction and control measures in rural areas. On the other hand, Colombia’s institutions are still heavily weighted in favour of repressive approaches to illicit crops, which are politically more effective and fiscally less onerous than more long-term solutions. This tension manifests itself in frequent confrontations between coca-growing peasants, even those included in state-sponsored voluntary eradication schemes, and the Colombian police (The Economist 2018). The PNIS represents an important attempt to overcome this tension. Still, the depicted picture illustrates contestation between central and regional governments, the state and communities, and Colombia and the world over how to deal with the drug problem. The problem boils down to providing the adequate combination of incentives to facilitate the transition for specific communities from growing an illicit yet lucrative crop to blending into the formal, more inclusive, yet less profitable national economy.

There is one more way in which illicit crops loom over the prospects of agreement implementation and advancement towards sustainable peace in Colombia: the Special Peace Jurisdiction will have to tackle whether and to what extent involvement in the drug trade will be considered in the definition of amnesties for fighters. Traditionally, the guerrillas justified their income from illicit crops as an
instrument of their revolutionary struggle. Critics have questioned this assertion, suggesting that the drug business came to stand at the core of their operations for many years, and demand that involvement in the drug trade should not be pardoned on political grounds. This issue will stand at the centre of the transitional justice system, due to start operating in 2018.

The various sites of contestation illustrated so far point to the “negotiation after the negotiation” that typically marks the aftermath of armed confrontation, and the post-agreement period generally, as “a mediation- and negotiation-heavy period” (McCandless 2018, 11). The 2016 Colombian peace agreement was a necessary step to move towards a more inclusive social contract and needed transformations and it draws from available institutional resources and capacities. However, as shown here, it has also deepened and made visible profound social disagreements and structural limitations, which operate well beyond the illegal groups as well as the control of the state. The next section and driver will shed light on some of these structural constraints.

4.0 DRIVER 2 – Institutions Delivering Effectively and Inclusively

Critical to the development of a resilient social contract are the performance and inclusivity of stable institutions. This section looks at how the ‘governance sphere’ of social contract-making is faring and, more generally, at the broader institutional context within which the wider political settlement processes are embedded. The section argues that much of the contestation that marked the peacemaking process reflects parallel processes at the level of formal and informal institutions, some of which point in the direction of greater inclusion and institutional presence, while others point in the direction of subverting or protecting the status quo. In between, hybrid institutional forms—sometimes supporting, sometimes competing with formal institutions—mark the Colombian institutional landscape.

Despite its conflict of long duration, Colombia, for the most part, did not resemble a war-torn country. For the past decades, the country has seen improved performance in terms of increased health and education coverage, efforts to overcome the rural/urban divide, and an improved territorial presence of the state in several regions (Barrera-Osorio, Maldonado and Rodríguez 2012; Agudelo, Cardona, Ortega and Robledo 2011). The country is now part of the CIVETS group (an acronym for the most promising emergent markets, including Colombia, Indonesia, Viet Nam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa) and is expected to join the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2018.

Figure 1 compares selected indicators of the Fragile States Index (FSI) for Colombia, including state legitimacy, poverty and economic decline, uneven development, group grievance, refugees and IDPs, and factionalized elites. 9 According to the Index, Colombia has improved from an FSI score of 92.8 in 2001 to 76.6 in 2018 (FSI 2018), putting it in the group of countries marked by “strong improvement”, although it is still in the range of “high warning” for fragility and instability. In terms of quality of education, according to the OECD, only three OECD countries show a faster rate of improvement in the reading skills of 15-year-olds than Colombia (OECD 2016, p. 3).

9. The FSI measures stability, providing annual scores for 12 primary social, economic and political (composite) indicators.
Despite these improvements in performance, state capacity has been uneven, both in depth and in scope (Call 2008). On the one hand, Colombia is a “country of regions” (González, Bolívar and Vázquez 2003) because of its particular geographic make-up (three large Andean mountain ranges cross the country from north to south) and because of the differentiated historical development of its political, fiscal and administrative structure, with some highly developed regions such as Valle and Antioquia, and other highly underdeveloped ones, like Chocó. “There are regions in the country with no state presence whatsoever,” said one Medellín-based scholar.10 Even when a wide-ranging decentralisation effort in the 1980s adjusted budgets and invested subnational authorities with increased control over political decision-making and budget allocation, this did not solve fundamental dissimilarities between centre and periphery, as well as among different regions, in terms of access to basic services and local capacity to address citizen needs.

The resulting gaps between urban and rural dwellers created windows of opportunity for local elites and illegal armed actors to dominate and capture regions and rents, co-opt local institutions and siphon off resources, resisting efforts at integration into national norms (Rettberg and Prieto 2018). Institutional weakness and differences between urban and rural areas have been linked to a historic inability to address and overcome the core conflict issues discussed in this study: the inequality, exclusion and low productivity of land have been linked to poor institutional performance and capability, while illicit crops, too, thrive on state incapacity to provide alternative sources of income to coca-growing peasant communities or effectively fight the spread of plantations. Not surprisingly, then, institutional weakness has been blamed for providing the social soil for armed conflict, corruption and other forms of violence in Colombia (Garay 2008; Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly 2015; Arjona 2016).

Of greater concern, perhaps, is the circular relationship between institutional weakness and conflict, as institutional distortions resulting from efforts to halt conflict have been cited to explain the state’s slow capacity to provide basic services and protection, elicit rule compliance by the population, overcome impunity and halt corruption (Leal 1984; Orjuela 2010; Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2012; Oquist 1978; and Pécaut 2001).

Although the Colombian democracy has been a functioning one, as competitive elections have been held regularly, it has also not completely stemmed—as has sometimes even deepened—the divisions among regions and levels of government and the violence that permeate Colombian politics. To bring a halt to partisan violence in the 1950s, the National Front system provided for parity and alternation (Hartlyn 1984) between the two main parties—the Liberal and the Conservative—for four electoral periods (1958 – 1974). The institutional design was effective in temporarily stopping the violence. However, it closed the possibility for new parties and regional interests to gain access to central decision-making and public resources (de Guevara 2002). Clientelism became the dominating political mechanism, in which trade-offs and favours are exchanged in return for electoral support (Leal and Dávila 2010). Today, the remnants of the National Front have been overcome and party allegiances have become increasingly flexible (Botero 2010). However, minority groups still claim that the system is tilted toward the interests of elites and of the political and geographic centre of the country. Abstention rates are high, signalling disaffection by citizens toward the rules of the game. While electoral democracy functions transparently and regularly, it does not seem to define more than who will occupy public posts, complicating the prospects for an inclusive social contract.

To better understand these contrasts and the tensions they cause, the concept of hybridity is valuable, which “reflects the heterogeneity and diversity within societies”, where “hybrid political orders with competing rules and claims to authority, power and legitimacy co-exist, overlap and interact” (Richmond 2011). In Colombia, hybridity between formal and informal rules and institutions has been prevalent in many territories, leading to a system of multiple layers and degrees of statehood. Among these layers, national-level institutions compete for allegiance with subnational clientelistic networks and other forms of hybrid social control. Examples include the following:

In many regions under their control, paramilitary groups and guerrillas, as well as neighbour, peasant or other civic associations, regulated and solved land- and drug-related disputes, developing coordination and consultation mechanisms with state authorities (Ramírez 2001), which often relieved tensions among the different claims to authority. The interaction of illicit economies and illegal actors with legal productive activity has fostered regionally specific governance structures and norms outside the formal realm of the national state (Rettberg, Leiteritz, Nasi and Prieto 2018). Competing jurisdictions among formal and informal actors and institutions haunt the currently ongoing attempts to implement the peace agreement, which systematically clash with the state’s historic inequalities to fulfil citizens’ expectations and to produce a proper equilibrium between national- and subnational responsibilities.

The contrast between a state that appears to improve performance and inclusion at the aggregate level but reveals weakness at the subnational and sectoral levels, and a stable democratic system that seems unable to fully capture and solve popular demands, may partially explain the state’s low and declining legitimacy (see Figure 1). In addition, social perceptions are not necessarily pegged to objective indicators of performance and legitimacy is very much contingent on expectations, which are dynamic, and on the positive or negative reinforcement by other social actors at specific periods in time. Colombia is a good example of this dynamic and complex interaction between levels of institutional capacity, varying expectations and legitimacy.

In sum, while the ‘political instability’ component of the Global Peace Index points at the increased peacefulness of Colombian society, this overall trend—brought about by the peace process as well as by the important advances made in terms of growing state capacity described above—does not

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11. Following OECD-DAC (2010, p. 15), “a political order, institution or actor is legitimate to the extent that people regard it as satisfactory and believe that no available alternative would be vastly superior.” In the words of McKechnie (ref), “Legitimacy shapes expectations and facilitates political processes, is highly context specific, must be earned, and it is usually the case that multiple narratives of legitimacy co-exist.”

12. As per the study’s overarching proposition, overall Colombian “institutions have become more effective over time, producing more inclusive results, and able to perform key functions in ways that enhance state legitimacy.”
hide remaining divisions in society on who and how to include in the economic and political systems and how to manage and institutionalize social interaction and conflict. This brings home the argument espoused in the introduction, which describes the Colombian social contract as unfinished and marked by ongoing contestation between groups of society and institutions at different levels. The next section examines the third driver of a social contract—social cohesion—with emphasis on individuals and groups’ attitudes and emotions in relation to the components of a resilient social contract.

5.0 DRIVER 3 – Social Cohesion Broadening and Deepening

In addition to analysing whether the political settlement is becoming more inclusive and addressing core conflict issues and whether state institutions are becoming more effective and legitimate, this research examines the role of broadening and deepening social cohesion as a driver of a resilient and inclusive social contract. This study refers to social cohesion as the formal and informal ties that hold society together vertically (between citizens/groups and the states) and horizontally (across citizens and between groups). It looks at social cohesion with respect to three domains: belonging and identity; trust and respect; and access, participation and representation. As opposed to the previous drivers—which pay attention to the structures shaping social behaviour—this driver emphasizes the content and target of these institutions: the actual people. This section examines in what ways and to what extent social cohesion in Colombia is deepening and broadening horizontally (across citizens, between groups) and vertically (in the relations between citizens/groups and the state).

Similar to the drivers focusing on peacemaking and institutions, a dynamic approach—suggesting advances in some aspects and reversals or persistent rigidity in others—is helpful to illustrate the multiple layers of the answer. In addition, this section suggests that social cohesion intersects with and shapes the other drivers examined in this study, allowing for a more nuanced understanding of the challenges of social contract-making in Colombia.

5.1 Vertical social cohesion

Vertical social cohesion refers to relations between citizens/groups and the state. As discussed in driver 2, despite important improvements, state performance still fails on several fronts, which is reflected in the dominating narrative in explaining armed conflict in Colombia. Today, Colombians tend to have a strong feeling of national belonging, but mainly to the outside, in relation to other countries. Internally, and although no significant secessionist movement has developed, many of the tensions described in the sections above persist or have deepened.

Some of these tensions are reflected in people turning away from politics and formal institutions: there is an open dislike of formal democratic politics, including institutions such as political parties (which are the least trusted institution), the executive, the courts and Congress. In fact, the Colombian population’s satisfaction with democracy has declined since 2004, along with trust in the government (see Figures 9 and 10). Only the armed forces, which are credited with the recovery of security over the past decade (see context section), consistently rank as the most-trusted among state institutions. Underlying most of the dislike towards state institutions is the perception that corruption is rampant: according to Transparency International, an international organisation tracking perception of corruption, Colombia ranked 90 among 176 countries in 2016, in contrast with Chile (24) or Uruguay (21) (Transparency International 2017).
In addition, as suggested by UNDP (2016b:11), improving socio-economic indicators (even if induced by state initiative) generate significant strains in terms of finding an equilibrium between society’s growing expectations and the state’s also-but-slower-growing capacities. These divisions can be linked to growing social unrest since 2015, as well as relatively high scores for ‘group grievances’ in Colombia.

In the course of history, efforts have been made to increase access, representation and a greater sense of belonging by citizens, by developing mechanisms to make sure the views of citizens and groups are not only heard, but reflected in the final policy and practice outcomes. For example, the 1991 Constitution—a watershed moment that was, at the time, considered a peace pact—included a series of fundamental rights linked to diversity and also set the basis for dozens of mechanisms for supra-electoral citizen participation (see context section), including respect for the political organisation and norms of indigenous and Afro-descendant groups. Also, over the past 15 years, there has been a series of institutions and approaches to deal with the legacies of conflict and bring together the different parties to the conflict. These mechanisms were developed by state and civil society and received significant normative and financial international backing. The recent peace agreement with FARC built on and complemented many of these institutions, laying out a wide web of participatory
mechanisms for communities to co-define illicit crop substitution programmes, victims’ reparations, ex-combatant reintegration, and historical truth, memory and reconciliation (see section on driver 1).

The effects of these efforts on vertical cohesion are mixed. On the one hand, the efforts listed above suggest that the proper foundations have been laid over the past decades to broaden and deepen vertical social cohesion and improve people’s trust in the state and its institutions, all in line with the development of a resilient social contract. The peace agreement with FARC has also contributed to these foundations. In sum, the process of building peace has provided numerous spaces and mechanisms to include relevant groups and stakeholders in discussions of public relevance as well as in policymaking. On the other hand, historical distrust in the state’s and democracy’s efficacy to deliver services and solve political conflict, deepened by the challenges implied by peacemaking and the implementation process, point to the need to strengthen substance in addition to form, so that citizens feel not only that they are being heard, but also that solutions occur and change is in their benefit.

5.2 Horizontal social cohesion

In addition to how citizens relate to the state, horizontal social cohesion, which captures how citizens view and behave with each other, is also indicative of the processes leading up to an inclusive social contract. At the core of the question is whether and which social groups and individuals are willing to incorporate different rights, people and norms.

Violence, aggression and distrust of others are high among average Colombians. Studies of Colombian children suggest that they are more prone to physical and relational aggression than those of other countries (Chaux and Velázquez 2009), mostly as a result of the legacies of violent behaviour learned and reproduced during protracted war. With adults, too, there are signs of concern: Latin America’s homicide rate—most related to urban violence—has been at least three times the global average, with Colombia a key contributor to these figures (Davis 2012). Distrust is high not only regarding the state, but also regarding fellow citizens. According to a 2016 study, 27.5 percent of Colombians have felt discriminated against because of their economic condition, 11.4 percent because of race, 8 percent because of some handicap and 4.9 percent because of sexual orientation. This suggests that, despite the formal recognition of rights (see section above), the acceptance of the rights of others still faces challenges. Despite feeling discriminated against, however, these groups trust others in their communities as much as non-victims of discrimination do (Figure 11). However, Colombia and other Latin American countries rank lowest on the global trust scale (Ortiz-Ospina and Roser 2017).

![Figure 4. Trust in Others, Depending on Feeling of Discrimination, in Percentage](image-url)
In addition to general trends, the issue of horizontal social cohesion begs the question regarding the legacies of more than 50 years of armed conflict on social attitudes and opinions in respect of the country’s past, specific groups, such as combatants and victims, and, generally, the prospects of achieving reconciliation.

An alliance of organisations including the Historical Memory Commission conducted a survey in 2011 of a representative sample of Colombian citizens (MH 2012) regarding former combatants and victims, the most vulnerable group in the aftermath of conflict. Overall, Colombians are more sympathetic to victims than to perpetrators (MH 2012). This can partially be attributed to the scale of suffering that happened in the country (one of every five Colombians has been victimised in some way and can, therefore, relate to the needs of victims) as well as the fact that the Colombian state made it a point to put victims ‘front and centre’ to the peace agreement and to the previously developed transitional justice and land restitution structure. This is also reflected in social attitudes: 79 percent of respondents to the survey would let their children share their school with children of victims and 83 percent would be comfortable with living next door to victims (MH 2012). So far, there has been widespread consensus in favour of material reparations for victims (although this has been slowly declining) and an ambitious reparation policy has been put in place (Rettberg 2008, 2015).

Faced with the negotiation of a peace agreement, victims were divided. Most favoured negotiations, but some FARC victims have remained in strong opposition to the agreement and, especially, to the light sentencing that resulted. In the coming years, the role of victims will be critical, both because they have mobilised politically (Rettberg 2015) and because they are invested with the moral authority to serve as ‘juries’ on state capacity to address historical shortcomings, mainly the solution to the land question.

General favourability to victims contrasts with much less willingness to share the social space with former combatants: of the survey respondents, a similar percentage (around 45 percent) would let their children attend the same schools as the children of demobilised combatants or would give former guerrillas a job. Increased social proximity, such as living next door to former combatants, is supported less (36 percent). Notably, opinions are even more unfavourable where politics is concerned: the majority of Colombians do not approve of former combatants participating in politics (only 21 percent support the participation of former combatants in politics – again, a hint to explain the referendum’s outcome). While skeptical in terms of sharing social space, many Colombians expect positive outcomes from demobilisation in general: a different study suggests that 49.2 percent of a representative sample of Colombian citizens expect Colombian society to become more inclusive after demobilisation of illegal armed groups and 46.1 percent expect tolerance to rise. However, 39.5 percent fear an increase in crime rates; 37.6 percent a decline in job opportunities; 36.2 percent the loss of social values; and 35.2 percent expect a decline in economic development. Only 16.5 percent expect an increase in interpersonal trust (Garcia, Montalvo and Seligson 2015: 99).

In contrast with the dislike for combatants by the general population, daily relationships among victims and perpetrators in the communities are generally peaceful, albeit marked by economic precariousness (Prieto 2012). As suggested by Nussio, Rettberg and Ugarriza (2015) as well as by Rettberg and Ugarriza (2016), victims, non-victims and demobilised combatants do not appear to be as profoundly marked by their war-related experiences in terms of their opinions and social practices regarding others as common wisdom—or political discourse—might suggest.

It remains to be seen what the long-term effect of the divisions revealed by the 2016 referendum and of the ongoing contestation among social groups will have on trust, generally speaking, and on attitudes towards victims and combatants and on implementation needs, more specifically. This is relevant especially in light of the need to promote national reconciliation and to foster a resilient social contract.
6.0 Analysis and Conclusions

This document suggests that there are opportunities and challenges for a more inclusive, resilient social contract in Colombia and varying levels of contestation regarding its main tenets. Some are related to the peace agreement and how it addresses the core conflict issues of land and illicit crops; others pertain to the wider realm of state capacity and performance, and social cohesion. At this moment, there is real potential for the peace agreement to reshape existing political power dynamics—especially at the subnational level—for more broadly shared results. But this is conditional on processes of institutional and social consolidation that exceed what the agreement can achieve on its own—effectively, more progress on drivers 2 and 3. For example, for the deficit in land distribution and productivity to be overcome and for the core conflict issue of illicit crops to be effectively addressed, stronger and better coordinated (national and international) institutions as well as social and political support are required.

The reaction to the peace agreement in Colombia, especially after the victory of the ‘no’ vote in the October referendum, revealed the strength of profoundly conservative political forces persisting within Colombian society, which will likely limit the depth and breadth of the transformative potential of the agreement. Beyond opposition by political and social actors, some of the aspirations of the peace agreement simply exceed the capacities and inertia of existing national state institutions as well as the political will for reform by significant social sectors, as has been shown in the initial implementation period.

This plays out especially in terms of rural reform and illicit crops, the two main drivers of conflict identified by the agreement: land-related aspirations may not seem particularly ambitious, but are enough to antagonize important social sectors in the country and will likely be put on the political agenda’s back burner. Although ideas to promote the development of remote regions in which conflict has raged enjoy widespread support, it is difficult to raise the needed funding, to deploy the required policy capacity, to recruit the needed local authorities and to prevent corruption from distorting territorial peace. Similarly, in the case of illicit crops, strengthened interdiction and repressive state capacity will not suffice to combat a global problem, with supply and demand occurring in such different economic and political contexts. This first tension captures well the gap between expected performance, legitimacy and inclusiveness of formal and informal institutions discussed in driver 2.

In terms of social cohesion, the topic at the core of driver 3, findings are mixed in terms of the societal willingness to engage in social transformation. On the one hand, trust among Colombians has been very much affected by a legacy of violence and conflict. This lays out a pedagogical and educational task for state and society in terms of promoting more tolerant and respectful ways of living together and in translating what has been achieved in many norms into actual practice. Notably, relations between victims and combatants are less confrontational than many had expected. Resistance to non-punitive punishment and FARC political participation is high, but this applies mainly to leaders of the illegal groups. Colombians are not fundamentally opposed to sharing the social space with people with a conflict background.

International actors have played diverse roles in relation to the armed conflict. The country has been an ally of the United States of America in the region for decades. The US ‘war on drugs’ has impacted Colombia’s peace process in varied ways. On the one hand, a huge military package known as Plan Colombia aimed to fight drugs, but equipped the Colombian armed forces sufficiently to enable them to turn the tide against the guerrillas. This turned public opinion in favour of the state and facilitated the initiation of talks. On the other hand, the emphasis on eradication of coca – directly related to the US mandate – has biased government response towards repressive approaches to illicit crops and curtailed government autonomy in pursuing more effective developmental results, e.g., through emphasis on alternative crops and sources of income. At the same time, the internationally backed financial and institutional scaffolding for peace, buttressing the nationally driven peace process, is
valued by Colombians and has been an unconditional ally of Colombia’s peace project, especially in contrast with domestic skepticism.

As confirmed in this document and highlighted at the outset, peace agreements are only part of a process of political settlement that is messy and complex and that takes time. In the end, actual transformation may result less from the agreement and more from institutional and social transformations that have been going on before the agreement and will last well beyond this process. In order to promote an eventual resilient social contract, the following related factors are essential:

Strengthening state institutions at the national and subnational levels in order to facilitate service delivery, engaging different levels and capacities. This includes addressing deep-seated inequalities in relation to land, lifting more of the population out of poverty and designing the proper instruments for the state to fulfil its developmental functions. These processes started before, and will last long after, the signature of the agreement and need boosting to support implementation of the agreement as well as advancing towards a resilient social contract.

Addressing the land issue from the point of view of inclusivity and productivity. As has been shown in this document, land stands at the core of many of the impediments to a resilient social contract. The state needs to provide the required scaffolding in terms of infrastructure development, credits to farmers and title formalisation as well as the persuasive capacity to engage with the different actors more productively and assertively and in a less confrontational or passive way. This should be approached, among other perspectives, through the lens of the victims of armed conflict, most of whom are landless and who serve as a ‘moral referent’ for land-related reform.

Promoting an international dialogue on illicit crops and the drug trade, with a stronger focus on public health and development and with clear engagement between producer and consumer countries. Colombia illustrates well how difficult it is to stem the problem unilaterally and how pervasive its effects are, and should demand a systemic response with a focus on the incentives and constraints facing rural communities and institutions.

Building trust among Colombian communities to promote the kind of reconciliation that undergirds the construction of a common vision for society – in other words, a social contract. This is also an educational, political and economic challenge, as processes of social understanding must be embedded in tangible institutions and material resources.

Areas of resilience also need engaging and further empowering, mainly a vibrant civil society and its state-sponsored ‘institutional scaffolding for peace’ or legal frameworks to tend to humanitarian needs (mainly forcibly displaced populations), to aid the reintegration of former combatants, to promote the reparation of victims and to develop transitional justice mechanisms in ways that support the inclusiveness and resilience of Colombia’s social contract.

NOTE ON CONTRIBUTOR

Angelika Rettberg is a full professor at the Political Science Department at Universidad de los Andes (Bogotá – Colombia) and a Global Fellow at the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO). Her research has focused on the relationship between legal resources, armed conflict, and crime, the dynamics of transitional justice, and business behaviour in contexts of armed conflict and peacebuilding.
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